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Abstract 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the most important protocol for the interconnectivity 
of the Internet. Although it has shown acceptable performance, there are many issues about 
its capability to meet the scale of the growth of the Internet, mainly because of the security 
issues that surround interdomain routing. The Internet is important to many organisations 
in various contexts. Thus, it is required to provide a highly secure protocol to keep the 
normal operation of the Internet. BGP suffers from many security issues. In this dissertation, 
we cover those issues and provide the security requirements for this protocol. We 
enumerate the numerous attacks that can be conducted against BGP. The aim of this study 
is to examine two considerably discussed protocols. Secure-BGP (S-BGP) and secure origin 
BGP (soBGP) have shown a revolutionary view on interdomain routing since they endeavour 
to providing security mechanisms at the protocol level. The objective is extended to 
comparing these two solutions by examining their contribution to the Border Gateway 
Protocol in terms of security. Moreover, we study their interoperability, efficiency, 
performance, and the residual vulnerabilities that each solution failed to resolve. Our 
findings have revealed that ultimately, the solution chosen will be dependent on the desired 
level of security and deployability. As is often the case with security, a compromise between 
security and feasibility is of a major concern and cost-effectiveness is the main driver behind 
deployment.  
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet has become a fundamental resource in academic institutions, government 
agencies and small to large businesses, as well as a vibrant part of our daily lives. At the 
present, the Internet connects millions of users across the globe. It has become the 
underpinning for commercial enterprises and a strong scientific tool. This large network of 
networks requires the interconnection and collaboration of a significant number of 
autonomously controlled networks. Paying for the service, users expect to reliably 
communicate with other clients or servers active on the Internet whenever desired. 
Electronic-commerce (e-commerce) based companies rely totally on the Internet such as 
eBay, Amazon, etc. According to a Shop.org / Forrester Research study conducted in 2008, 
online retail sales raised this year by approximately 17% reaching $204 billion. This is an 
instance of the criticality of the Internet to many companies.  
The good functioning of communication in the Internet relies on routing, which is the 
component that determines feasible paths (or routes) for data to flow from a source to a 
destination. Computers in the Internet depend on routing data in order to be able to 
discover and communicate with each other. Currently, the Internet routing infrastructure is 
intolerably frail due to many shortcomings. It is commonly misconfigured [1]. Moreover, it 
has considerably weak security properties [2]. In addition, it is hard to manage [3]. As a 
consequence, communication becomes unreliable and unpredictable.  
In this chapter, we cover the basics of Internet routing. Moreover, we describe the 
hierarchical structure and addressing of the Internet. Then, we identify the configuration 
issues that occur to interdomain routing and their impact on the Internet. Finally, the 
security issues that surround the routing infrastructure and the Internet itself are broadly 
covered. Then the aims of this dissertation are defined in the conclusion. 
 
1. INTERNET ROUTING OVERVIEW 
 
Although it is generally thought that the Internet is a single network that people 
connect to; it is however composed of a large number of interconnected networks that are 
independently operated, called Autonomous Systems (ASes). For instance, when a user 
makes an HTTP request to a server in a different network, data travels across multiple ASes 
before reaching its destination, as shown in Figure 1.1. Technically, an AS represents an 
8 
 
internetwork or a collection of networks and routers, controlled by one entity. Sometimes, 
these ASes have competitive objectives but they must collaborate with each other, by 
exchanging routing information, in order to realise large-scale and universal connectivity. 
 
 
 
Figure1.1: An Internet path traversing multiple ASes 
 
Within an AS, routing is applied and controlled internally by the owner through internal 
routing protocols. It ensures correct connectivity and reachability of nodes across the AS for 
internal communication. After correct configuration, Interior Gateway Protocols (IGPs) are 
used for automated routing information update. They ensure that routing information 
present at each router is most reliable and cost-efficient with respect to the metrics used to 
quantify the cost. A few examples of such protocols are: RIP (Routing Information Protocol), 
OSPF (Open Shortest Path First), IGRP (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol), and EIGRP 
(Enhanced version of IGRP). While interior routing handles packets travelling from an 
internal source to an internal destination, data flowing outside an AS or sourcing from an 
external AS cannot be routed via IGPs. The information required for such scale is out of 
internal routing’s reach. For such traffic, more information and flexibility is required because 
of the restrictions that can be met in other ASes. Furthermore, IGPs’ design cannot scale 
within internetworks as large as the Internet. Thus, more data needs to be used for routes 
that travel along different autonomous systems. 
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The solution is External Gateway Protocols (EGPs). This type of protocols uses higher 
level abstract data to define routes between different ASes. An analogy for this can be 
identified when someone travels to another country by route; and they know through 
routing information provided that they have to travel across different countries to get to the 
destination. Then, in each country more data is provided on routes to get to the border to 
pass to the next country and so on. Moreover, every country has its own policies concerning 
its border and the type of nationalities or persons allowed in the country. The countries 
represent autonomous systems and people travelling are packets flowing. Every AS has a 
number of routers used for routing information within the AS and some are defined to be 
the border routers that send traffic to, and receive it from neighbouring ASes. These 
domains (i.e. ASes) have different policies set by the owners via filters created accordingly 
using different parameters present in the routed traffic. Every router that is a speaker of the 
interdomain routing language can communicate with its peers in the neighbouring ASes. 
They exchange routing information on the reachability of different autonomous systems.  
The current interdomain routing protocol on the Internet is the Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) [4]. Global reachability between ASes is established by setting up BGP 
sessions between their border routers. Then, they exchange reachability information to 
different ASes in the Internet. Every AS may have between a single to hundreds of routers. 
Every router selects the best route to each destination. Routing in the Internet is destination 
based, where every router selects the next hop (i.e. router) to forward traffic to, based on 
the packet’s destination IP address [5]. More details on BGP are addressed in Chapter 2. 
Routers within an AS must use an IGP to discover the path to the router which one of its 
interfaces is pointing to the next hop AS. Internal routing protocols are not discussed in this 
dissertation. Other work provides more detailed treatment [6, 7, 8]. 
 
2. INTERNET ADDRESSING AND AUTHORITIES 
 
Communication on the Internet is based on IP addresses and AS numbers. IP addresses 
are 32-bit numbers; usually each byte is separated by a dot and represented in a decimal 
integer. For example, the 32-bit binary 01111101 10100011 00101101 00100010 would be 
represented by 125.163.45.34. Since an IP address is 32-bit long, one may think that there is 
a limit of about 4.2 billion ( 322 ) on the number of hosts that can be supported. In practice 
and due to address reservations and assignments which are part of the addressing system, 
the maximum size is lower but using a few technologies such as NAT (Network Address 
Translation), provides support for larger Internet [9].  
Institutions in the Internet are assigned these IP addresses in a contiguous manner (i.e. 
blocks of neighbouring addresses). They are represented by the first address and a mask 
length. This is a method identified by the Internet Engineering Task Force to eliminate 
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classful addressing and start the new Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) approach [10, 
11]. It is a method used for assigning IP addresses without relying on the standard IP 
address classes (e.g. Class A, Class B, etc). It introduces a flexible mask that reflects the size 
of the network and network ID. In classful, the network ID element could only obtain a 
predefined number of bits: 8, 16 or 24. In classless, the number of bits is flexible and varies 
depending on the mask. For example, the prefix 164.0.2.0/24 with a mask 255.255.255.0 
contains all the addresses where the first 24 bits represent the network ID and remain 
static, and the last 8 bits represent the different addresses that can be allocated to different 
hosts in the network (i.e. from 164.0.2.0 to 164.0.2.255). For this example, 254 hosts can be 
allocated in this network because the first address represents the network address (i.e. 
following our example, the network address would be 164.0.2.0) and the last one is the 
broadcast address (i.e. 164.0.2.255 from our initial example). Instead of storing routes for 
every address, this type of allocation (i.e. CIDR) results in smaller routing tables. This leads 
to a smaller number of route advertisements, since the routers need only to identify the 
network segment of the address and forward it accordingly. 
Public IP Addresses were originally assigned to different regions in the world by the 
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), and then by the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). IANA is responsible for global management of the IP 
addressing systems used for routing Internet traffic. IP addresses are usually assigned in a 
hierarchical way. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) assign IP Addresses to users. They obtain 
allocations of IP addresses from a Local Internet Registry (LIR) or National Internet Registry 
(NIR) or from their Regional Internet Registry (RIR). As shown in Figure1.2, there are five 
RIRs maintained by IANA in different regions of the world: North America Region (ARIN), 
Latin America and some Caribbean Islands (LACNIC), Africa region (AfriNIC), Europe, The 
Middle East and Central Asia (RIPE NCC), and Asia and Pacific Region (APNIC). IANA only 
provides additional allocations of IP Addresses to RIRs when required. It does not deal 
directly with ISPs or end users only in exceptional circumstances such as allocation of 
multicast addresses or other protocol specific needs. Lately, ICANN started to delegate this 
responsibility to these regional registries. Thus, allocation of IP addresses and AS numbers is 
done regionally.  
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Figure1.2: IANA’s Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) 
 
More information is required for interdomain routing to scale with the Internet’s 
growth. Autonomous Systems are entities, part of the routing information in the Internet. 
They group together a number of IP prefixes, which are under the same administrative 
control and conform to the same routing policy. Therefore, they are assigned numbers 
named Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs). ASNs are 16-bit numbers and similar to IP 
addresses, they are assigned by ICANN as the highest authority or its delegates, the 
different RIRs. Multiple organisations can use private ASNs to route its packets to the ISP 
using inter-AS routing. These private ASNs can vary from 64512 through 65534. However, 
the ISP must officially register its AS number. Public ASNs are allocated from 1 to 64511. The 
AS numbers 0, 54272 to 64511, and 65535 are reserved [12]. Therefore, customer ASes are 
provided with private AS numbers for interdomain communication with their provider. 
Then, the latter would advertise the routes for the customers not including their private 
ASNs but its public AS number(s).  
 
3. CONFIGURATION ISSUES 
 
Interdomain routing involves a large population of interconnected entities, mainly 
communicating with messages through a set of rules and “etiquette” forming a protocol. 
Because of the large scale of the internet, interdomain routing protocols and mainly the 
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) become rather complex. This makes the configuration of 
these protocols vastly a critical part. Moreover, any small error can lead to devastating 
consequences. Through configuration, these protocols become rather flexible and allow 
organisations to meet further requirements around accepting, rejecting, forwarding traffic 
and more. With configuration, an AS is able to choose the ASes to carry traffic for [61], the 
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way traffic enters and leaves the AS [62], the way its routers learn routes to external 
destinations. 
Business demands and changes that occur at a higher frequency in the Internet may 
also change routing information and traffic patterns. Coupling the latter with the complexity 
of configuration, administrators become frustrated when they have such responsibility. 
Human error is highly predictable in these situations. Thus, configuration issues have 
happened and caused, as envisaged, problems to the Internet community. In 1997, a minor 
ISP in the USA, and more precisely in Florida, caused all Internet traffic to be routed through 
it due to a misconfiguration [63]. This led to the entire Internet going down for a while. This 
is one of the major damaging misconfiguration in the history of the Internet. Another one 
happened in 2002, where US telecom giant WorldCom brought down 20% of the nation’s 
Internet backbone in USA as reason of a misconfiguration problem [64]. Although 
configuration issues are not the main concern of this dissertation, they prove the fragility of 
interdomain routing. More information on misconfiguration issues can be found in this PhD 
thesis [65]. 
 
4. SECURITY ISSUES  
 
The Internet was designed for communication purposes and the security concerns were 
not part of the requirements and the design process. Thus all interdomain routing was not 
secure; but fulfilled to some extent the communication between Autonomous Systems. 
Although some exterior routing protocols have proven to be stable, there are still some 
serious thoughts on whether they will still be able to handle the rapidly growing Internet. 
Well known exterior routing protocols could be the target of attacks that could disorder 
Internet Services, such as the de-facto standard BGP. 
After glimpsing on misconfiguration issues, it was realised that interdomain routing, at 
its state, is highly fragile and vulnerable. If it is as such to human error, these issues can be 
used maliciously by an attacker. This means that the adversary is able to conduct an attack 
that might aim at projecting a similar behaviour to a misconfiguration. Thus, interdomain 
routing suffers from serious security issues. As covered before, these protocols rely on 
message exchange. These messages are not protected from many violations. The first is 
Integrity. Interdomain routing does not provide integrity services in its messages making it 
vulnerable to undetected altering of data. Furthermore, source authentication of data is not 
supplied. ASes do not have a security mechanism to prove their identity and the address 
space they use. Furthermore, routers within those ASes cannot verify and validate other 
ASes. Last but not least, the authenticity of the routing information is not protected. This 
means that it can be altered or created by a malicious individual. These security problems 
prove that interdomain routing is miles away from reaching concrete stability. 
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5. CONCLUSION  
 
The Internet has become a crucial part, if not the spine, for most companies and 
businesses. Thus, internetworking is the backbone for the operation of both corporate and 
non-corporate networks. The raison d’être of internetworking is Interdomain routing; the 
latter is ubiquitous and underpins all internetworks including the Internet. Thus, efficiency, 
performance, reliability, and stability of the protocols used for routing are tight 
requirements that should be considered at all times. The issue that arose was that security 
in routing was not considered from design to implementation and deployment, 
consequently making these protocols exceptionally vulnerable to attacks. Due to their 
complexity, current research is more focused on optimising them for the expanding Internet 
rather than securing them. Moreover, routing security failures happen despite good order 
and functioning of protocols. The problems are generally caused by malicious participants 
and also due to misconfigurations. The issue of routing security is typically outside the scope 
of traditional communication security. Also, adding security needs to be less resource 
consuming, which means that performance and efficiency are always prerequisites. 
In this dissertation, we aim at providing a comprehensive approach at defining the 
security issues that concern interdomain routing. Then, by providing a few solutions, this 
will give us the ability to analyse and compare them. The solutions chosen are Secure-BGP 
(S-BGP) and secure origin BGP (soBGP). This choice was made because of the high focus of 
the research community on these two protocols. They both aim at providing a certain level 
of security to the de-facto standard of interdomain routing: BGP. 
At first, an overview of BGP-4 is covered. This provides the reader with the required 
background knowledge to understand the interdomain routing in more depth. Then, a 
threat analysis of BGP is conducted. This covers its vulnerabilities and potential attacks and 
attack scenarios against it. Followed by the latter is a chapter dedicated to BGP security. It 
supplies the reader with some current practices to secure BGP and the security 
requirements for the protocol. After that, we examine two solutions that aim at securing 
interdomain routing. Then, we provide an analysis of their level of security and performance 
in a large scale. Furthermore, deployments and backward compatibility issues concerning 
both solutions will be covered. Finally, we end the dissertation by providing a conclusion 
and future work that should be focused on, in the next few years. 
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Chapter 2 
OVERVIEW OF BGP-4 
 
AS illustrated before, the Internet is composed of Autonomous Systems (ASes). 
Internally, the latter use interior routing protocols such as RIP (Routing Information 
Protocol), OSPF (Open Shortest Path First), IGRP (Interior Gateway Routing Protocol), EIGRP 
(Enhanced version). ASes are connected together through exterior routing protocols in 
order to form larger internetworks and especially the Internet. Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP) is the most important protocol that is holding the interconnection and 
communication between different ASes in the Internet. In this chapter we provide an 
overview of BGP. Firstly, we cover its topology and main entities that are required for its 
functioning. Then, we cover the different traffic types that are found in interdomain routing. 
After that, storage and advertisement of routing information is illustrated. Then, we explain 
the algorithm behind BGP. Finally and in the last section, we examine the different 
operations included in the protocol and messages used for exchange of routing information.  
In the early Internet, routers communicated differently than today. There were some 
centralised routers functioning as a core AS, using the Gateway-to-Gateway Protocol (GGP) 
for internal communication and Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) for inter-core AS 
communication. When the Internet expanded into an AS oriented architecture, EGP had still 
the ability to function and handle the communication. Thus, EGP (Exterior Gateway 
Protocol) was still operational as an exterior routing protocol for ASes and the Internet. 
However, it had some weaknesses that affected its routing ability while the Internet was 
rapidly expanding. When the number of ASes grew, the importance of the data flow 
similarly grew. Thus, the necessity of developing a new protocol that could scale well within 
the fast growing Internet was critical. In June 1989, the first version of the Border Gateway 
Protocol (BGP) was developed and published in RFC 1105 [13]. The current standard for BGP 
is BGP-4 RFC 1771 [14] which came after BGB-2, BGP-3 and a first version of BGP-4. BGP-4 
has additional defining standards, RFC 1772 [15], 1773 [16], 1774 [17]. Then, a few 
modifications were updated to BGP-4 and published in January 2006 in RFC 4271 [18], 
making RFC 1771 obsolete. 
BGP, in one sentence, is used to first exchange reachability information between ASes. 
Then, that information is used to determine routes to different networks. In each AS, one or 
multiple routers are assigned to perform interdomain routing by running BGP software in 
them. BGP routers are internally (i.e. inside the AS) linked between each other and 
externally with different BGP routers in other ASes. Every router stores routing information 
in a set of Routing Information Bases (RIBs). This information is propagated across the 
whole internetwork. This will allow reachability information to be available everywhere, 
which ensures that every node in the internetwork knows how to reach any other node. 
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Moreover, BGP is able to handle non-uniform AS topology. This means that ASes can be 
randomly connected and not affecting the running of the protocol. Moreover, ASes must 
have at least one BGP router but may have as much as required. BGP is required and does 
scale with random topologies of autonomous systems. Because of this flexibility, route 
determination and selection structure is rather more complex. The protocol uses more than 
what is required for other routing protocols which is only the next hop, such as RIP. Instead 
of using a distance-vector approach, BGP applies a path-vector protocol. The routers use 
more information about the entire path which is represented by a chain of interconnected 
ASes. The scale of interdomain routing is so large that it requires cautious route decisions. 
Hence, the algorithm that will define the best route will need to direct its attention to 
reliability rather than the cost and efficiency. It will focus on the avoidance of router loops 
and other error conditions. Furthermore, route selection relies on the BGP policies applied 
at each AS and if traffic can flow without being filtered out. The update of tables and other 
operations are based on the exchange of messages achieving different tasks. These different 
BGP messages will be explicated in detail later in this chapter.  
BGP is a very important protocol and the de facto standard for interdomain routing. 
Before being able to analyse the security issues of this protocol, it needs to be defined and 
analysed accordingly to find the different holes that make this protocol extremely 
vulnerable to different attacks. First, BGP topology will be illustrated with the different 
entities that are required for the protocol to function. Then, the data storage and processing 
by the routers will be examined. Furthermore, an algorithm overview and the data required 
will be covered. Last but not least, BGP detailed messaging and operations will be analysed, 
since they remain the weakest link in terms of security for interdomain routing.  
 
1. BGP TOPOLOGY 
 
One of the most important features of BGP is its flexibility. It can handle a full mesh 
topology (i.e. every AS is connected to all other ASes), a series of simultaneously connected 
ASes or any other type of arrangement. A more interesting observation is that it is also able 
to handle changes in topologies that can take place over time. A pertinent remark to note, 
BGP has a prerequisite assumption which reflects the fact that it is not responsible for the 
traffic when it flows inside ASes. For BGP, an AS is autonomous and applies to the fullest the 
fact that it is controlled by an independent owner of that AS. So, BGP does not rely on the 
internal topology of the AS; and only uses the information transmitted to it from the AS and 
distributes it to other ASes.  
BGP SPEAKERS 
 
In interdomain routing, routers, in ASes, connected with other routers in other ASes are 
called speakers. This is because they speak the same language which is exterior routing, 
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following the same protocol which is BGP. They are in a way the representatives of ASes in 
the borders. There are two types of routers in every AS. Boundary routers are those which 
use interior routing such as OSPF. Those that use exterior routing (e.g. BGP) are border 
routers. Interconnected BGP routers from bordering Autonomous Systems are neighbours. 
They are two border routers representing their ASes allowing flow of packets between the 
two entities. An AS can have more than one BGP router. These routers are Internal Peers 
using what is known as Internal BGP (IBGP). The other type occurs when the routers are 
neighbours in different ASes. They are called External Peers and use External BGP (EBGP). 
They are both similar but differ slightly, and the difference will be explained further in this 
chapter. As shown in Figure2.1, router R1 shares an external link with R2. The link is a 
physical medium link and does not relate to the BGP session established, which is an EBGP 
session for this case because it is between neighbouring ASes. However, R1 shares an 
internal link with R2 which will be used to establish an IBGP session. R3 and R4 do not share 
a link but they will be able to set up an IBGP session to propagate routing information 
coming from external peers. The link here is a physical medium from the physical layer in 
the OSI model or the TCP/IP architecture.  
 
TRAFFIC FLOW AND TRAFFIC TYPES 
 
In general, there is always a high-speed, high-capacity AS that serves and accepts 
carrying other ASes' traffics. This can happen only if arrangements have been made prior to 
allowing traffic flow through an AS. There are different types of traffic flowing in 
interdomain routing. The traffic flowing within an AS which either originated in the same AS 
or delivered by another AS is the Local Traffic. Transit Traffic is the traffic flowing within an 
AS that originated from another AS and intended to be delivered to another AS. 
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Figure2.1: An Example of a BGP Topology 
 
 
An ISP, in general, has many ASes connected to it that use its services to reach the 
Internet. Some ASes in an ISP allow transit traffic to flow inside them. These are 
Multihomed ASes. A Multihomed AS is an AS that is connected to more than one AS and 
traffic can be transit or local. Due to some policies in certain domains, some ASes may not 
allow transit traffic. These are Stub ASes. A Stub AS is an AS that is connected to only one AS 
and the inbound traffic is always intended for the AS itself (i.e. only allows local traffic). As 
shown in Figure2.1, AS3 is a multihomed AS and allows traffic to transit. If AS1 sends some 
data to AS2, traffic will flow from R6 or R5 to R1 via EBGP. Then, traffic will be forwarded 
internally, within the multihomed AS3, from R1 to R2 through IBGP. Following that, traffic 
will be forwarded from R2 to R8 using EBGP. 
 
AS ROUTING POLICIES 
 
In order for an AS to communicate with another distant AS, its traffic must at least 
transit through another AS before arriving and the end point. The issue behind that is that 
many ASes are forced to be used for transit traffic. This will certainly consume resources 
such as bandwidth, processing and memory, and also can be a threat to the AS. That is why 
there are routing policies to be configured for each AS in order to control traffic. These 
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policies are non-technical definitions. Moreover, they can be of a political nature, 
organisational, business context, competitiveness or security measures. This allows the 
implementation of these policies without relying on central authority. These policies are not 
part of the BGP protocol. Furthermore, they are configured by the owner of the AS and 
depending on the organisational policies. 
One of the policies that can be implemented is the No Transit Policy. This policy would 
be used when no transit traffic is allowed to flow within the autonomous system. This 
means that the AS is defined as a stub. To allow more flexibility for a multihomed AS but still 
restrict some packets flowing from certain ASes, Restricted AS Transit Policy can be forced. 
It will also expose itself only to ASes that are accepted in the policy. Another type of data 
used to restrict a certain type of traffic is for example time. The latter can be used as a 
parameter to restrict or allow transit traffic only at certain times. This type of policy is 
named Criteria-Based Transit Policy. The different parameters that can be used allow 
greater flexibility to the corporate needs of the AS owners.  
All these types of policies do not allow greater flexibility. Even if they do, effectiveness 
and complexity will decrease dramatically if restriction policies increase in each multihomed 
AS. The issue that can occur from such policies is the decreasing number of Transit ASes. For 
instance, most ASes prefer, for security measures, to accept only local traffic. That will cause 
a very slow and inefficient interdomain routing. However, the latter are designed in a way 
that there will be certain ASes intended to carry large amounts of transit traffic. Some high-
speed, high-capacity ASes will play the role of multihomed ones. Moreover, carrying traffic 
between ASes happens only after certain arrangements have been made.  
STORAGE AND ADVERTISEMENT 
 
The way routing information is processed and stored is crucial to the routing 
infrastructure. The aim of BGP is to facilitate the exchange of this routing information 
between external and internal peers. This will allow speakers to determine efficient routes 
to each network. The main activities of route information management in each BGP router 
comprise of different tasks. The first task is Route Storage. Each router stores routing 
information about the reachability of other networks. This information is received from 
other internal or external peers. The information will be stored in a database for later or 
immediate processing. When a router receives a Route Update, it must make a decision on 
how to use the information. Depending on many parameters, choice of updating the routes 
is taken. However and before that, the decision process also takes in consideration when 
and how the information should be used to update the routing information. In addition to 
this task, there is Route Selection. This deals with the selection of best routes using some 
parameters in the database stored about different routes. The fourth task is Route 
Advertisement. This process is used to propagate the reachability of other network 
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throughout new or updated routes. This is accomplished with the route update process 
through an UPDATE message, as shown in Figure2.2. 
Every BGP router, routinely, stores, updates, selects and advertises routing information 
to other peers. Routing information is stored in every router in a routing information 
database named Routing Information Base (RIB). When an UPDATE message is received, it 
is stored in a database named Adj-RIBs-In, as illustrated in Figure2.2. The latter holds 
information received from BGP peers. When such a message is approved, it is stored in the 
main core database that holds selected routes considered to be valid and best routes to 
reach a speaker. It is called Loc-RIB. When data is received, approved and stored, it needs to 
be advertised to neighbours. The router takes the relevant information and stores in an Adj-
RIBs-Out database. This process is based on what is known as BGP Decision Process. It is 
part of the system of Route Update, Selection, and Advertisement. The previous three 
databases can be implemented within one entity and used differently. Those were a way to 
define different sections of a database, while they can be physically three separate 
databases or put together. 
 
 
Figure2.2: Route Information Management and Storage in the Route Decision Process 
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2. ALGORITHM OVERVIEW 
 
As stated before, using simple Distance-Vector or Link-State attributes is not sufficient 
and can conclude in looping routes or what is called deadlocks (i.e. Infinite loops), since the 
topology of interdomain routing is in some way random or arbitrary. It is, therefore, 
necessary to know more than the next hop. By storing the characteristics of the entire path, 
there is a possibility to know how to compute and change routes. So, BGP advertises 
networks as destinations and the path description for reaching those destinations. Such 
algorithm is known as a path-vector algorithm [19]. All this data is stored in the RIB of each 
speaker. These attributes are categorised depending on their importance. 
The first type is Well-Known Mandatory. These attributes must be recognised and 
known by every speaker. They, also, must be included in all messages sent, be it route 
description or UPDATE message. The second is Well-Known Discretionary. These are 
attributes that must be known but may or may not be included in UPDATE messages; 
meaning they are optionally for the sender but mandatory for the receiver. The third type is 
Optional Transitive. These attributes are optional to be known and sent by a speaker. 
However, if received, they must be passed on even if not understood or recognised by the 
speaker. The last one is Optional Non-Transitive. These are similar to the previous ones (i.e. 
Optional Transitive); however, when received and not recognised or known, they must be 
dropped by the receiver. 
 
STANDARD PATH ATTRIBUTES 
 
Clearly, path attributes are one of the most important features of BGP as they provide 
the protocol with the flexibility required for such routing scale. These attributes will be 
defined not in the greatest detail since they will be analysed concerning the security issues 
that arise regarding them. Table2.1 represents a summary of BGP path attributes found in 
TCP/IP Guide book [20], page 659. 
 
  
Attribute Classification Type 
Value 
Description 
Origin Well-Known 
Mandatory 
1 Specifies the origin of the path. Whether the 
path came from an interior protocol, older 
exterior protocol, or another source. 
AS_PATH Well-Known 
Mandatory 
2 A list of AS numbers that indicates the path to 
the destination network. It is used to collect 
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routes and to detect routing loops. 
Next_Hop Well-Known 
Mandatory 
3 It represents the next hop router to be used to 
reach the destination. 
MULTI_EXIT_DISC 
(MED) 
Optional Non-
Transitive 
4 When an entry to or exit from an AS includes 
multiple Entry/Exit points (i.e. More than one 
BGP router), this attribute is used to 
discriminate between them (i.e. Choose one 
exit or entry point over the others). 
LOCAL_PREF Well-Known 
Discretionary 
5 Used in communication between BGP 
speakers in the same AS to indicate the 
preference of a particular route. 
Atomic_Aggregate Well-Known 
Discretionary 
6 If a BGP speaker receives a set of overlapping 
routes, while one is more specific to the other 
(e.g. One is a subnet of another one), it sets 
the path attribute to 1 when it uses the less 
specific one. 
Aggregator Optional 
Transitive 
7 It contains the AS number and BGP ID of the 
router that performs route aggregation. It is 
used for troubleshooting. 
Table2.1: BGP Path Attributes 
 
BGP DECISION PROCESS 
 
A BGP speaker can initiate new routes. It may obtain information on a new route from 
an interior protocol on an AS. It will then create an entry in its RIB and decides whether to 
advertise it or not. Moreover, when a router cannot reach a destination, it advertises an 
unfeasible or withdrawn route to its peers. However, when receiving an UPDATE message 
containing a new or an updated one, before it is approved, it goes through a decision 
process. Most of the path attributes are used to decide which route is more adequate to 
store in the Loc-RIB, then advertise it from Adj-RIBs-Out. This process is part of the route 
update, selection, and advertisement functions. The process of deciding on which route is 
best to use is tightly dependent on evaluating the data relating to the path attributes. As 
shown and described previously in Figure2.2, upon arrival of an UPDATE message, the route 
information may travel across different logical locations. This data is analysed throughout 
the decision process. The latter encompasses three phases.  
The first phase deals with the analysis of the received data. Whenever new routing 
information destined from a peer BGP speaker arrives, it is analysed at the Adj-RIBs-In. 
Then, a preference level is allocated to the route. The preference level is assigned based on 
various criteria. Since BGP uses path-vector algorithm, the number of ASes between the 
router and the network is one of them. Evidently, it will have a higher preference level for a 
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route containing fewer ASes in the AS_PATH parameter. Another very important criterion is 
concerned with policies. Data may reach an AS where its BGP speaker filters the packet out, 
because it does not allow that traffic based on some policy criteria. Thus, even if the 
number of ASes is lower does not denote that it is the best path. This is because it cannot 
guarantee that the end node is reachable through that path. In addition to that, the origin of 
where the path came from is also a decision factor. 
When the level of preference is attached to the route, the best route is selected 
amongst all similar destination routes in the second phase. The route with the highest 
preference level is selected. If a set of similar routes (i.e. similar destination prefix and 
identical prefix length) share the same highest preference level, a tie-breaking rule needs to 
be applied to retrieve only one best route through other parameters. It first starts by 
checking that route with the highest LOCAL_PREF value is selected. This degree of 
preference could have been either selected locally or learnt from another external speaker 
via an UPDATE message. If this step ends with only one route selected, the tie-breaking 
decision process terminates. Else, it uses the next parameter which is the AS_PATH. The 
route with the shortest AS_PATH is selected. Then, if the speaker takes in consideration the 
MULTI_EXIT_DISC, the route with the lowest value is selected, ensuring that the multiple 
routes were learnt from the same bordering AS. If this filtering keeps more than one route, 
the NEXT_HOP is checked for the best cost. This involves comparing the cost of each 
NEXT_HOP in the IGP’s database. Then, if all the routes were leant by IBGP peers, the route 
learned from an EBGP speaker with the lowest identifier is selected. If the route was learnt 
only via IBGP peers, the route with the lowest BGP identifier is selected. This way of 
selection proves that there is no guarantee on the efficiency and reliability of the route. 
Moreover, it shows that the decision process can be tricked very easily by inputting false 
routes but with the best preference level.  
After the first and second phase, the best route calculated by the speaker needs to be 
advertised to neighbouring peers. In the third phase, the best route is selected from Loc-RIB 
and stored in Adj-RIBs-Out for advertisement. This function is part of the route 
advertisement process. The route is sent to BGP peers via an UPDATE message. The rather 
key limitation of BGP is that it does not deal with individual routers but with ASes. Anything 
that is happening within an AS is hidden to the outside world. Thus, selecting the fastest and 
lower cost route is not that efficient, since not all ASes are the same. Some ASes are larger. 
This means that there can be longer looking routes but a quicker one, while faster looking 
routes are sometimes the longer ones (i.e. with a higher cost). This limitation is an 
important vulnerability because any BGP lookalike speaker can fool a real one into selecting 
for example a false route as a best route. The security issues of BGP will be dealt with in the 
next chapter. 
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3. BGP OPERATIONS AND MESSAGING 
 
After looking at how BGP-4 is used to store the routes and select the best ones, higher 
level communication is important and crucial to realise and keep the routing information up 
to date. BGP’s operations mainly deal with messaging. These messages are crucial to the 
routing infrastructure because they are means by which route information is exchanged 
between BGP speakers. In every AS, BGP routers need to be allocated to perform their task. 
However, this part is not included in the protocol description. Hence, it is the responsibility 
of the AS’ administrators to define the BGP speakers. Then, the bordering routers need to 
be linked physically in order to communicate.  
When, for instance, two routers are configured to talk BGP with each other, the first 
move they do is establishing a Transport Control Protocol (TCP) session [21] at port number 
179. This is the layer four OSI model TCP transport session. It is a three way handshake 
starting from the initiator of the session with a SYN packet. Then, the receiver responds with 
a SYN ACK packet. Finally, the session initiator sends an acknowledgement ACK to start the 
transmission of packets. As we can observe, BGP requires certain reliability in exchanging 
data. Rather than creating a new protocol for reliable communication, TCP already exists 
and is a connection-oriented reliable protocol. The use of TCP is not accidental. It is a 
protocol that accomplishes the orderly delivery of messages, detects duplicates, recognises 
when information has been lost and retransmits it, etc. Moreover, it can control the rate of 
sending packets so that the receiving end will not be overloaded. 
Before an attempt of a TCP connection to be established between peers, the BGP 
session is in the Idle state as shown in Figure2.3. Then, when a speaker initiates a 
connection with a peer, the BGP session is in a Connect state. If the TCP connection cannot 
be established after a while, the initiator periodically keeps trying to establish a connection. 
The BGP sessions changes to an Active state. When a TCP connection is established, external 
or internal peers are assured of the reliability of the delivery, as long as the connection is up 
and running. 
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Figure2.3: BGP Session Finite State Machine 
 
After a TCP connection is established between peers, they do not know anything about 
each other in terms of BGP’s level data, since it is only a TCP connection. Therefore, the first 
thing peers do is to identify each other in many ways. This will allow them to establish a BGP 
session. To do so, they will need to exchange an OPEN message. The router that initiates the 
first OPEN message transitions in an OpenSent state. When a node receives a similar 
message, it transitions to an OpenConfirm state. When the parameters sent in the OPEN 
message are accepted, each side sends a KEEPALIVE message and transitions to an 
Established state. Details of these messages will be defined later in this chapter. At this 
time, the BGP session is considered to be live and routes can be exchanged. When a session 
is established at first, it is required by the protocol that all routes with different prefixes 
need to be exchanged. For this task, it uses UPDATE messages. For instance, if a speaker has 
30,000 diverse prefixes and configured to send them all, a large number of UPDATE 
messages will be sent advertising all these prefixes. Then, only changes in routes are 
advertised between routers. The important feature of BGP is that considering policies, it 
does not always accept the learnt route. The receiving speaker can whether accept or reject 
the route update. These BGP sessions remain in the Established state. If a serious error 
occurs, the neighbour noticing the error sends a NOTIFICATION message to its neighbour 
and ends the TCP connection. This will lead to the denial of all routes received from that 
peer and going back to the Idle state. 
 
IBGP ISSUES AND ROUTE REFLECTION 
 
These BGP sessions are established with all speakers in neighbouring ASes. Every 
speaker shares a session with its external neighbour through EBGP. Similarly for IBGP, every 
speaker within the same AS share sessions with all the speakers creating a full mesh of IBGP 
connections. This does not imply that it has to share a physical medium with all speakers 
within the AS. On the contrary for EBGP, external peers are physically linked. The difference 
between IBGP and EBGP is on the retransmission of a valid best route from an UPDATE 
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message. When a speaker receives an UPDATE message from an IBGP peer, it cannot 
retransmit to other IBGP peers in the AS. However, when it receives a valid UPDATE 
message with a valid new best route from an EBGP peer, it retransmits the route to all its 
IBGP peers and other EBGP neighbours. 
The issue that rises regarding IBGP full mesh sessions is that it is computationally 
consuming. Moreover, this enforces peers receiving updates within the same AS not to 
advertise that route to a neighbour. By having, for example, 50 IBGP routers in an AS, it 
leads to 1225 IBGP sessions; and by adding only one router, the number of sessions will 
become 1275 (the calculation is done through the equation: (n.(n-1))/2 where n = number 
of routers). Thus, the solution for this issue is Route Reflection [22]. The concept of route 
reflection is to add a level of hierarchy to IBGP. This will lead to the ability of some routers 
to readvertise the learned routes to other IBGP peers. This eliminates the need for a full 
mesh. The routers that are able to readvertise are Route Reflectors. Those that get the 
reflection of routes are Reflector Clients. This makes route reflectors advertise the new 
routes only to reflector clients. Similar hierarchy speakers (i.e. route reflectors or reflector 
clients) do not readvertise routes between them. This is accomplished by adding a new 
attribute ORIGINATOR_ID with an attribute type 9. It is optional and non-transitive with a 
four bytes length. It is used to keep track of router Identities. Thus, a route reflector does 
never advertise a route to an IBGP speaker with an ID listed in the ORIGINATOR_ID 
attribute. This will also prevent loops of UPDATE messages. The second attribute added is 
also an optional non-transitive that groups a route reflector and its clients in a cluster. The 
attribute is CLUSTER_LIST and its type code is 10. When a reflector advertises a route to a 
non-client peer, it adds the current cluster ID to the related attribute. When a reflector 
receives a route, it checks if it matches a similar route with similar cluster ID to accept or 
refuse it. Another approach to solving the issue of scaling with IBGP full mesh approach is 
Autonomous System Confederations [23]. This will not be covered but details are found in 
RFC 5065.  
 
ROUTE FLAP DAMPENING 
 
One of the main issues that occur in interdomain routing is called Route Flapping. This 
happens when a link oscillates between connection and disconnection. As stated before, 
when a link goes down, the TCP session goes down and this will make all the learnt routes in 
that session withdrawn from both peers. Then, the link goes up and a new session is 
established and all the withdrawn routes are exchanged. The issue is when this happens 
frequently in the Internet’s scale. 
A solution to this is to hold back the advertisement of routes somewhere near the route 
until it turns into a stable state. It is called Route Flap Dampening (RFD) [24]. It allows the 
speaker to consider the stability of a route and the peer in choosing whether to utilize or 
readvertise the route. RFD uses a value penalty that defines the criticality of the route 
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flapping frequency in a link. Whenever the route flaps, the value is incremented. Penalty is 
decremented when the route stops flapping for a while. If penalty reaches a certain value, 
the route is suppressed and avoided for later forwarding. It stays dormant until the value 
decreases below the threshold. RFD is only used for EBGP and not IBGP. If it did, there will 
be a lot of inconsistencies within ASes because of the route suppression. 
 
TCP MD5 AUTHENTICATION 
 
This is not part of the BGP protocol; but one of the sole security mechanism used by 
ISPs is generally TCP MD5 Authentication. The TCP connection can be attacked, for example 
by sending an RST (reset) messages causing an unsynchronised state of segment numbers. 
This will cause the TCP connection to stop and hence the BGP session to halt as well. 
Consequently, adding some practical security was required. To protect BGP sessions against 
the introduction of spoofed TCP segments into the connection stream, the proposed 
solution is an option added to the TCP connection, being able to hold an MD5 digest [26]. 
MD5 is a hash function; and the one used outputs a 128-bit digest. For more information on 
the hash function, chapter 9 in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography [25] provides further 
details on the cryptographic primitive. 
To apply this protection mechanism, both parties (i.e. BGP peers) need to share a key or 
a password prior to any connection. The MD5 digest will be included in all TCP segments. To 
calculate it, it will require the following inputs as presented in RFC 2385 [27]: 
1. The TCP pseudo-header (i.e. source IP address, destination IP address, zero-
padded protocol number, and segment length) 
2. The TCP header, excluding options and assuming a checksum of zero 
3. The TCP segment data 
4. An independently specified key or password, known to both TCPs and 
presumably connection-specific 
 
After calculation of the digest, it is sent to the BGP peer. The latter will compute the same 
inputs and compare the calculated and received digests for similarity. If they are similar, 
then the segment is accepted. If they do not mach, the receiver drops the segment. Now, 
for a successful attack, it is required to guess the TCP segment number and the shared 
password. The standard does not include the way to generate the shared password or key 
and leaves the matter independent to the implementers or administrators. This does not 
sanitise the sessions from attacks. MD5 has its weaknesses as a hash function and 
vulnerabilities still remain. Moreover, the password generation is not defined, and this 
leaves an open issue on key space or password strength. The security issues will be included 
in detail in the next chapter. 
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4. BGP MESSAGES 
 
BGP, as a protocol, runs its functions through the exchange of messages. It uses four 
types of messages to keep sessions up, update new routes, notify of errors and open BGP 
sessions. AS described before, these messages are exchanged between speakers 
subsequently after a TCP three-way handshake is established. A common header is shared 
between all four messages as shown in Figure2.4. The Marker field is used for 
authentication or synchronisation between a pair of peers. This value of marker will depend 
on the message being sent. For instance, when the first OPEN message is sent, this field 
contains all 1s. When the security option (i.e. applying TCP MD5 authentication) is decided 
between peers and se, this field will carry the 128-bit calculated MD5 digest when the 
security option is used. If it is not used by the peers, the Marker field will be filled with 1s.  
The Length field indicates the total length of the entire BGP message in octets, including the 
header. The length must vary from 19 to 4096. The Type field indicates the type of the 
message sent: 1 for OPEN message, 2 for UPDATE, 3 for NOTIFICATION and 4 for KEEPALIVE. 
 
 
Figure2.4: BGP Common Header Format 
 
 
OPEN MESSAGE 
 
 This is the first message sent by a BGP speaker to its peer subsequently after a TCP 
connection has been established. As shown in Figure2.5, the first three fields are common 
and are present in each message. The Version field specifies the version of the BGP protocol 
the sender is using. My Autonomous System field reveals the AS number of the sending 
speaker. Hold Time is used by the sender to suggest a time interval by seconds between 
successive transmissions of KEEPALIVE messages. BGP Identifier field represents the IP local 
interface address of the BGP router. The Optional Parameters Length field indicates the 
length of total length of the Optional Parameters (i.e. encoded in TLV: Type, Length, Value, 
used for authentication and optional added modules). 
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Figure2.5: BGP OPEN message format 
 
 
KEEPALIVE MESSAGE 
 
This message is the factor that keeps the connection established between peers. 
KEEPALIVE is used by speakers to constantly monitor the reachability of their peers. These 
messages are exchanged periodically by peers. They must be exchanged before the hold 
timer expires. If it does, the connection is dropped by the peer not receiving KEEPALIVE 
messages. The recommended time between two successive KEEPALIVE messages is a third 
of the hold time interval. This message contains the basic data in a common header format, 
as shown in Firgure2.6. 
 
 
Figure2.6: BGP KEEPALIVE message format 
 
 
UPDATE MESSAGE 
 
When a link is established, peers begin an ongoing process of message updates of the 
reachability of Networks. Each router encodes the new information from its RIB into a BGP 
UPDATE message. The latter contains information about network address and path to 
various networks (AS_PATH). The route updates are incremental, meaning they only send 
the information about routes that have been changed. This will save bandwidth. Apart from 
the first three common format fields, an UPDATE message exposes the withdraw routes in 
its Withdraw Routes field. This comes after the length of those withdrawn routes in 
Unfeasible Routes Length field. In Total Path Attribute Length, the advertising speaker 
exposes the length of the path attributes field which contains the list that comes after it in 
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Figure5.7. Finally, Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) is used to advertise the IP 
address prefixes for the route being advertised. 
 
 
 
Figure5.7: BGP UPDATE message Format 
 
 
NOTIFICATION MESSAGE 
 
When a BGP speaker notices an error or catches an exception, it sends a NOTIFICATION 
message. After doing so, the speaker imminently closes the TCP connection. The Error Code 
field indicates the type of error that occurred. Error subcode provides more specific 
information concerning the error condition and the nature of the error. The field Data 
explains the cause for the notification. 
 
 
Figure2.8: BGP NOTIFICATION message format 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
After viewing details about the protocol, it is majorly relied on the exchange of different 
messages. Moreover, one of the major issues with BGP is its complexity compared to other 
routing protocols. This can be understood because of the scale of the Internet. Coming back 
to our major concern which is security, BGP as a protocol does not have any mechanisms 
that provide protection to the messages exchanged, as viewed over this chapter. The use of 
MD5 authentication is not part of the protocol and not mandatory. Moreover, it has its 
weaknesses. In the next chapter, we cover the vulnerabilities of BGP and the attacks that 
can be conducted against it, followed by possible attack scenarios. 
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Chapter 3 
BGP THREAT ANALYSIS 
 
As covered before, BGP was designed in order to overcome the communication issues 
that were encountered in the previous protocol (i.e. EGP). BGP has shown great stability 
over almost the last two decades. However, there are still some serious thoughts on 
whether they will still be able to handle the immensely growing Internet. One of the major 
issues in BGP is Security. It was considerably well designed for communication purposes, but 
the security concerns were left behind and were not part of the design process. Thus, BGP is 
fragile as a protocol and can lead to serious damages to the Internet community. In this 
chapter, we illustrate the vulnerabilities that exist in the protocol. Then, we provide the 
reader with the attacks and attack scenarios able to disrupt the functioning of interdomain 
routing and the Internet in general.  
 
1. BGP VULNERABILITIES 
 
In the last chapter, the overview of the protocol BGP was covered. No single security is 
part of the protocol except some mechanisms were added to make it harder for a malicious 
behaviour to succeed, such as the TCP MD5 authentication. Any entity that connects to the 
Internet pays its ISP for that service. When it connects, it becomes part of the ISP's 
administrative Autonomous System. An entity is eligible to route its own traffic to other 
entities through its ISP. The latter routes its own traffic through its upstream ISP and 
receives routes from it. It can be deducted that systems are grouped together and can be 
targeted as such by a malicious individual [41]. As a consequence, vulnerabilities found in 
BGP are very serious. 
As stated in the first chapter, interdomain routing suffers from misconfiguration issues. 
BGP suffers from the same problems. This means that misconfiguration which can be a 
human error can lead to serious damages. Hence, an attacker can provoke similar or worse 
damages to the interdomain routing or the Internet as a whole.  BGP suffers from 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited in many attacks. 
 
BGP MESSAGE VULNERABILITIES 
 
When two peers establish a session, whether EBGP or IBGP, the protocol does not 
protect the exchange of those messages from different violations. The absence of security 
measures prior to the session establishment or after leads to the nonexistence of protecting 
the integrity of those messages. If the integrity can be violated, this means that a malicious 
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individual can exploit this vulnerability by intercepting and changing the transmitted 
messages as they will. 
Another issue considering update messages is that they can be replayed by an attacker. 
Apart from the TCP sequence number as a weak mechanism, BGP messages can be replayed 
since they do not provide any freshness service. An old message can be replayed with the 
right TCP sequence number after a new session is established. This means that if a route has 
been added and a malicious individual intercepts that UPDATE message, they can replay the 
update after the route has been withdrawn. This might cause an invalid route to be present 
in the forwarding table (i.e. BGP routing table Loc-RIB and Adj-RIBs-Out). 
In addition, there is no mechanism that provides source authentication of messages to 
BGP speakers. The TCP MD5 authentication was added to overcome the problem of a 
potential message sent from other than the legitimate BGP peer. However, as will be 
illustrated in the next session, MD5 authentication has its weaknesses; and in today’s 
standards it is not classified amongst highly secure mechanisms for integrity or source 
authentication security services. Moreover, this so called solution is not part of the BGP 
protocol. Although now majorly used, it has many weaknesses considering many aspects 
from MD5 hashing collisions, key management issues, weak passwords, etc. This is not a 
long term secure solution for a protocol as important as BGP. 
Although it is not part of the major aim in securing BGP, confidentiality can lead to 
better protection of messages exchanged between peers. Message interception is one of 
the easiest and cheapest attacks that can be used to extract data required for further 
attacks against BGP. This protocol does not provide any confidentiality service. However, 
this is not part of the key concerns in securing interdomain routing. 
 
ROUTING INFORMATION ANNOUNCEMENT VULNERABILITIES 
  
One of the major issues in BGP is to deal with the quality of routing information 
transmitter. In other words, the reachability information needs to be qualitatively trusted 
since this is the aim of routing in general. It is inherently intrinsic to routing. Hence, the 
importance of this information is trivial for the routing infrastructure to keep the packets 
arriving at the intended destinations. Following the previous analogy in chapter 1 about 
routing in roads, if the information provided is wrong, someone who wants to go to 
Germany from England can end up in Algeria for instance if routing information were wrong. 
Thus, there has to be an authority that decides and advertises the routing information from 
a country to another. This means that someone travelling generally buys a guide approved 
by an authority which can be the Interior Ministry in some countries or any other trusted 
party. Coming back to interdomain routing, the announcements of reachability information 
needs to be validated by an authoritative AS. Not any AS can provide new routing 
information. For example, an ISP, as the upstream AS for its clients, is the one which 
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provides routing information. However, BGP does not validate this authority for UPDATE 
messages. Thus, any AS that might be malicious or apprehended by an attacker, is able to 
announce new routes to its peers. 
Since BGP does not provide data origin authentication and does not provide authorities 
for route announcements, the authenticity of the path attributes announced by each BGP 
speaker is not validated by the protocol. This denotes that all the attributes described in the 
previous chapter can be played around with by an attacker and cause damages to a stub AS, 
multihomed AS or even a portion of the Internet. There is no mechanism in the protocol 
that checks for the validity of the data used for UPDATE and OPEN messages. 
Consequently, the absence of security controls and safeguards, introduced previously in 
vulnerabilities, can be exploited to craft attacks, using the weaknesses of the exterior 
routing protocol to conduct larger attacks goals or against it directly. There are several 
generic attacks that can be conducted against interdomain routing. The first one is 
Eavesdropping; which is the interception and reading of BGP messages, as the data is in 
clear text. BGP does not protect against Replay attacks. These are, simply, the recording and 
resending of messages. Moreover, it does not protect against Message Insertion attacks. 
Having the knowledge of sequences of packets can eliminate part of this issue but still 
remains if the attack is well crafted. Then, an attacker would have the ability to insert bogus 
messages into a BGP session for example. In addition, there is no protection against 
Message Deletion attacks. An attacker can intercept and delete messages between 
Speakers (i.e. inter AS routers communicating with each other) or totally remove routes 
from the forwarding table. An attacker is also able to remove messages between two 
speakers, modifies and resends them back to the receiver. Interdomain routing is vulnerable 
to Message Modification attacks. Moreover, it is weak against Man-in-the-Middle attacks. 
A malicious individual is able to corrupt the communication streams between speakers and 
becomes an unnoticed and unknown intermediary. Furthermore, it is largely vulnerable 
against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. These generic attacks will be covered in following 
section in more detail and in different attacks against different parts of the BGP protocol. 
 
2. BGP ATTACKS AND ATTACK SCENARIOS 
 
 
BGP has been receiving quite a lot of attention considering its fragility towards 
malicious attacks. As a protocol, BGP can be categorised amongst the weakest and most 
dangerous protocols. This is due to the serious economic damages that would emerge if the 
Internet as a whole, or more precisely the core registries and routers were to be attacked 
and compromised. This section will demonstrate some attacks that if well conducted can 
succeed and violate the well functioning of BGP and inter-AS communication [33]. Then, it 
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will demonstrate the usability of those attacks against BGP to aim at larger goals of 
adversaries. 
 
ATTACKS 
 
As previously illustrated in Chapter 2 Figure2.3, different attacks in those different 
states in the BGP session finite state machine can be conducted by malicious individuals. 
These can be found at different stages in the BGP session establishment process. Referring 
back to the finite state machine, the attacks can be conducted at the Idle state where there 
is no session established between speakers. Attacks also can happen at the Connect and 
Active state where malicious data is injected and can cause a denial of service. The first 
three states refer exclusively related to the Transport layer TCP session flaws. BGP inherits 
all the attacks and security flaws from the TCP session, in addition to other attacks 
concerning the BGP session itself. The latter can be accomplished in the OpenSent, Open 
Confirm and Established states [33]. 
 
EAVESDROPPING 
 
This attack is required in most of the coming attacks. Although it is not a major concern 
in securing BGP, this attack if eliminated will make further attacks much harder to craft 
because of the lack of knowledge that can be gathered. Thus, this attack is generally more 
passive. It is used to listen to messages exchanged between peers. Generally, it can be 
achieved by physically tapping the physical medium between BGP speakers. Another way of 
realising it is by gaining local access to a network segment, compromising a server and 
installing sniffing software. The adversary can then use this gained information from this 
attack to craft more dangerous ones [33]. 
 
COMPROMISE MD5 AUTHENTICATION 
 
MD5 authentication was added to the BGP session in order to protect the session 
establishment and all the messages exchanged when the session is up [27]. After the 
exposure of MD5 vulnerabilities in the previous chapter, there are more flaws and attacks 
that can be conducted in many ways and not necessarily relating too closely to the protocol. 
Social engineering [28, 29] is a technique used to deceive people into giving in secret 
information or changing parameters into their system that would make it more vulnerable 
or open for remote access by attackers. If the AS owner has weak security policies related to 
passwords, it would be an security issue knowing that BGP MD5 authentication is based on 
sharing passwords. Any type of social engineering can be conducted to deceive one of the 
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administrators in both ends (i.e. both speakers in each AS) into giving the password for the 
MD5 calculation. Moreover, the attacker as a social engineer has two chances for each 
password, since there are two peers in different ASes sharing the same session but having 
different security policies. For instance, one of the ASes has weak security measures when 
an employee is dismissed. Supposing that the employee is an administrator who knows the 
password, and he is not happy of what happened. An attacker who observes what is 
happening in the company can track the fired administrator and deceive him into giving up 
the password for vengeance. The administrator has nothing to lose and gives away the 
password to the attacker. The latter can then use that password to initiate an unauthorised 
session with a BGP speaker, inject packets for poisoning the routing table or causing a denial 
of service against the session or the routers’ memory capacity [33]. 
Another way into compromising the password is to capture it using a key logger for 
example.  Key loggers are applications used to record users’ key strokes. The aim of key 
loggers is spying on users by monitoring their passwords and their daily routine, performing 
political, commercial or industrial espionage, etc. For this situation, the victim is the 
administrator responsible for interdomain routing or networking and the aim is monitoring 
and retrieving the MD5 password for later abuse. The general goal of attacks varies 
according to the motivation and the gain. If the attacker can gain or compromise access to 
an administrative machine, they will be able to install a hostile application that monitors 
and logs keystrokes typed by administrators. These applications also provide a clear monitor 
view of the activity in the machine. In this way, the attacker can retrieve the MD5 password 
from the logs or see it in the screen while it is being typed [33]. Another way into 
promiscuously retrieving the password is to sniff traffic while it is being sent within the 
management traffic. This can be achieved by tapping the physical medium, or installing 
sniffing software after compromising a server’s operating system, locally in the AS. In a 
different way, router configuration is a major issue and many things are left unnoticed; and 
one of these things is passwords. The latter can be captured from configuration by 
compromising the network management server or the router itself [30]. The router can be 
physically or logically compromised. If the attacker can access the data centre where the 
router is placed, they can recover the password using many methods, especially rainbow 
cracking [31] for time and efficiency. However if the attacker cannot physically access the 
router, there are many remote logical attacks able to succeed. The malicious individual can 
sniff the password, recover the password as they might do in a physical attack, or just guess 
it. They can also exploit the security flaws present in different applications used as a 
medium for configuration such as Telnet and SSH (Secure Shell). This will provide them with 
the MD5 password required to establish a session and inject poisonous packets. 
In addition to these attacks, another one is to actively brute-force the MD5 password by 
sending to a peer a segment with the MD5 authentication option. Then, the attacker can 
watch the response from the peer to determine the validity of the key used for the hash. If a 
valid password was found, the attacker can gain access to the router with the password and 
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also use it to poison the routing table and more. These attacks will be illustrated later in this 
chapter. Such attack can be easily conducted if the attacker can obtain an MD5 
authenticated packet. This will allow the attacker to conduct an offline attack. For example, 
the attacker can use a rainbow table attack which is implemented in many cracking tools. 
MD5 as a hash function is not very robust to collision attacks [32]. Collision avoidance or 
limitation is one of the most important security properties of hash functions. Collisions 
happen when given two different messages; the digests calculated from those messages are 
similar. In August 2004, MD5 collisions were found. V. Klima used a method that found a 
collision in around half a minute with a notebook computer [32]. If the attacker can exploit 
these weaknesses of MD5 in finding collisions, they can use those collisions and craft 
poisonous packets for instance. 
 
SETTING UP AN UNAUTHORISED BGP SESSION WITH A PEER 
 
As viewed in Chapter 2, a TCP session is required for peers to establish a BGP session. 
The requirement for an attacker to establish an unauthorised session with a peer is to pass 
the MD5 authentication, if required. The latter was examined in the previous session. As 
covered before, BGP inherits all the vulnerabilities of the TCP protocol. Thus, it inherits all 
the attacks against the TCP protocols and sessions. Not all the attacks are useful, and only 
the useful attacks will be exposed.  
An attacker can use some foot printing and reconnaissance techniques to gather 
information about an AS. If an attacker can know the IP address of a BGP speaker, its peer, 
and the ports used for a session, they can spoof the TCP packets with the source IP address 
and port number of the peer. Then, they can establish an unauthorised TCP session with the 
speaker, using the usual three way handshake (SYN, SYN ACK, and ACK). This attack can be 
done on a remote EBGP speaker or a local IBGP speaker. In both cases, it can lead to easier 
table poisoning for example. Another way to achieve such attack is to gain unauthorised 
access to the router and reconfigure it. The configuration should allow a peering session 
with the attacker’s router. Then, a session can be established between the attacker’s router 
and the BGP speaker, since it is allowed after compromising the router configuration [33]. 
After this, the attacker will end up in a connected and/or authenticated TCP session, in an 
OpenSent state where they can start sending BGP OPEN messages to start an unauthorised 
BGP session. Once this is established, the attacker can more easily launch attacks that can 
affect both the peer and the network itself. 
 
BGP SPOOFING ATTACK 
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In order to communicate with a speaker in an existing BGP session formed by the 
speaker itself and its legitimate peer, the attacker needs to acquire more information about 
the session. This attack is thought to be easy; however it is not. They will have to acquire the 
following information to be able to conduct this attack: 
Source IP address of the peer: To do this, they can use ICMP traceroutes from various 
places on the Internet through the BGP peer. J. Rexford and her research team found an 
accurate way of making an AS-Level traceroute [34].  
Source port number: This field must be additionally spoofed. The initiator of the BGP 
session always has a port number greater than 1024 and sequentially or randomly selected; 
while the peer will receive the packets in port 179. Since the attacker does not know which 
BGP router initiated the session, they might have to sniff the traffic between the peers and 
get the information required.  
TCP Sequence Number: The TCP protocol has a sequence number field that is used by the 
receiving end through a windowing technique. If any packet received is in a range below the 
window range, the packet will be dropped. This feature weakly prevents replay attacks. 
However, since BGP sessions are designed and meant to stay connected for longer, the 
window size is quite large. This gives the attacker a better chance in falling within the 
window size and getting the right sequence number. The attacker would have to send a 
number of packets at once with incremental sequence numbers, until one is accepted. 
TTL (Time To Live): TTL is a safety mechanism used to drop a packet if it gets lost in the 
Internet. The TTL is a number that represents the maximum number of hops a packet can 
take. Generally, ISP peering sessions use EBGP; and since they are directly connected, the 
TTL is set to 1. If the received packet’s TTL is greater than 1, it is dropped. The attacker will 
have to traceroute the packet and not the number of hops the packet takes before it 
reaches the target. Then, the attacker can set the TTL accordingly so that when it is 
received, its value will be 1.  
In one hand, the attack can be TCP based spoofing, where the attacker targets the BGP 
port of the router which is not always 179, depending on which side the communication was 
initiated. On the other hand, the attack can target the peer with a spoofed BGP packet. For 
both types, the attack is not that easy to craft and the attacker will require the knowledge of 
the previous fields. These fields must all be similar and synchronised with the legitimate 
session. In addition, the attacker might need a layer 1 (physical) or Layer 2 (Data Link) 
medium. After successful completion of this attack, the victim speaker will think that the 
message is legitimate and processes it as if it has been sent from its peer. 
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BGP HIJACKING 
 
This attack will require the above attack (i.e. BGP spoofing) to be successful. The 
attacker will need to masquerade BGP status packets as if they were coming from the 
neighbour. The packet would look legitimate to the peer receiver. However, it would carry 
malicious BGP updates. These updates could be causing a denial of service to the BGP 
session, introducing false routing information, or withdrawing valid routing information. 
Effective BGP hijacking will require further knowledge to the attacker about the BGP 
session. They would require knowing what was set up in the OPEN message. This can be 
done through different eavesdropping attacks, as mentioned in the first attack through 
sniffing and physical wire tapping. The attacker can reroute traffic towards his station 
causing a serious violation of privacy and confidentiality.  
 
ROUTE INJECTION 
 
In the last sections, attacks in setting up an unauthorised session were covered. If an 
unauthorised session is set up, other attacks are easier to achieve. The latter include adding 
nonexistent routes, changing route preference level to a faulty route, etc. However, if the 
attacker cannot set up a new session or wants to attack an existing BGP peering session, 
they would have to craft their attack differently and will need more information on the 
session, as pointed up earlier in spoofing and hijacking attacks. The attacker can use one of 
the previous attacks to inject or advertise routes where the network does not have 
allocation authority. It is an unauthorised route injection attack. This will draw away traffic 
from the authorised network causing a Denial of Service (DoS) on the network that allocated 
the address. Since it is a layer 3 spoofing (i.e. IP spoofing), it is easy and there is no 
protection in the protocol against it. 
Another type of route injection is the unallocated route injection attack. The attacker 
would advertise IP addresses that have not yet been allocated by IANA. They can overload a 
router’s BGP and forwarding tables with these types of IP addresses. This can create some 
issues to the routing infrastructure in the Internet. Routing tables will grow in size, which 
may lead to BGP table explosion and therefore resource exhaustion. This occurs because 
most ISPs do not filter out unauthorised routes. The reserved IP address space set by IANA is 
publicly listed but a number of ISPs ignore them in their filtering. 
 
DE-AGGREGATION ATTACK 
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This attack can cause a lot of damage to the internet community and generally to ISPs. 
It can also happen when misconfigurations occur. This attack uses a feature of BGP in 
choosing the more specific routes for their routing tables. If an attacker can break into a 
multihomed customer AS, they can launch an attack from it. They would have to announce 
more specific prefixes (e.g. /24s). Since the most specific route is always selected, this will 
consume more router memory and disrupt global Internet routing operation and can crash 
routers as well. The attacker will send unauthorised UPDATE messages to peers with specific 
prefixes. Generally, saturated links cause more damages and can disrupt the routing 
infrastructure. If the ISP does not perform strict ingress route filtering on customer ASes, 
the attack would not only have an impact on the ISP itself, but these routes will propagate 
across the Internet or its peers.  
 
TCP BASED ATTACKS 
 
RST Attack 
 
This attack will require the ability to spoof messages within an existing TCP connection 
established between peers. The attacker can send a spoofed message with the RST bit set to 
1, to one of the peers. The latter will terminate immediately the connection with its peer 
causing a denial of service. The peers then will have to establish another connection and 
send routing all routing data to each other. If this attack is conducted after many 
connections, route flapping will occur as discussed in Chapter 2. This will cause the routers 
to suffer from Route Flap Dampening (RFD). The attacker uses this feature of BGP to 
increase the penalty value in RFD. This will cause a temporary and possibly long inactive BGP 
speaker, which will affect with a significant impact a large number of users [36, 39]. 
 
SYN RST Attack 
 
This attack can be performed indirectly through another attack. The latter is called SYN 
attack. The attacker here will cause an indirect reset by sending a TCP packet within the 
window frame with the SYN bit set to one of the speakers in the peering session. The 
receiver will send a RST set packet and immediately stop the connection. This attack is an 
indirect way of using the RST field to stop the connection. This attack is rather more 
dangerous since it can cause the generation of more packets resulting in flooding the 
connection. This can happen if the attacker targets one BGP peer that is connected with 
multiple peers. Because this is a reflection attack, all the peers will send the same RST 
packet at the same time causing resource saturation [38]. 
 
SYN ACK Attack 
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When a legitimate TCP SYN is sent from a speaker to a peer, an attacker can learn that 
information and send a TCP SYN ACK packet before the peer does. The peer will receive an 
empty ACK reply. Then, the legitimate peer will send a RST to close the connection. The 
attacker needs spoof the SYN ACK message with the right sequence number.  
 
ICMP Attack against TCP 
 
This attack has a particularity of being able to be achieved blindly. The attacker will not 
need all the information required for the RST attack. ICMP messages are used to handle 
errors and fault recovery on the network. If the ICMP message reports a hard problem, TCP 
will close the established connection. If it reports a soft problem, TCP will record the 
information and retransmit data until it is acknowledged or the session is closed [35]. 
Because ICMP messages do not require the TCP specific fields such as sequence number, the 
attacker can blindly send and ICMP error message indicating a hard error. This will cause a 
TCP RST attack to both peers. This will end the connection between the BGP peers causing a 
denial of service. This attack can exploit RFD to cause a complete halt for the EBGP session.  
 
TCP SYN Attack 
 
If an attacker is able to send a SYN TCP session opening packet to a speaker during the 
connection establishment of the speaker with its neighbour, they can cause the legitimate 
peer’s SYN connection to be ignored by the speaker since it would appear to be a second 
connection. The attacker can then go on with the sequence of required messages to get to 
the Established state for the BGP session. If a similar session has been established with the 
legitimate peer, the speaker will detect the collision and chooses the session to be ended. 
This will depend on a BGP identifier. If the attacker chooses the fields carefully, the 
legitimate peer’s session can be terminated.  
 
SYN Flooding Attack 
 
Using previous attacks, the attacker can impersonate, prior to session establishment, a 
BGP neighbour. The attacker can send a large number of TCP uncompleted connections (i.e. 
only the first message in the three-way handshake SYN) to the BGP router at port 179. This 
will cause the exhaustion of TCP connections memory and can crash the router. This is a 
denial of service attack. This can also be used in a distributed way, where the attacker sends 
multiple TCP SYN messages to the target from different nodes. This is a distributed denial of 
service attack. These attacks are hard to deal with since there is nothing BGP mechanism 
that can defeat them [37]. 
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BGP Messages Attacks 
 
BGP messages are used to exchange routing information and connectivity between BGP 
peers. Knowing the non-existance of security in those messages, they can all be used to 
cause different types of attacks that cause a denial of service. These messages can be used 
in a malformed way or at states where the normal running of the protocol’s process does 
not expect it. 
 
OPEN message Attack 
 
As stated before, these attacks, generally, target a denial of service of the BGP session. 
An attacker can send an OPEN message to a speaker at the Active or Connect state. This will 
cause the speaker to terminate the connection and drop the connection and turn to the Idle 
state. These attacks require careful timing. The attacker may use sniffing techniques or be a 
man-in-the-middle in this establishing session. Moreover, the attacker can send an OPEN 
message at the Established or OpenConfirm states. This can cause a connection drop when a 
detection of a collision occurred in the BGP speaker’s process. Another similar attack is to 
send a carefully spoofed OPEN message at the OpenSent state. This will cause the speaker 
to transition to an OpenConfirm state. When its peer sends an OPEN message, the speaker 
will detect a collision and drop the BGP session. RFD can be exploited in this attack. 
 
KEEPALIVE message Attack 
 
The attacker needs to synchronise well the KEEPALIVE message when it is sent. If they 
are able to do so, they can send a KEEPALIVE message before the BGP session is established. 
This means that they send it at the Active, Connect or OpenSent state. When a peer receives 
such message at these states, it detects a synchronisation problem and terminates the 
session returning to the Idle state. RFD can be exploited in this attack too. 
 
UPDATE message Attack 
 
If an attacker can spoof an UPDATE message, they can send one with more than the 
maximum number of prefixes allowed, at the Established state. This will cause the session to 
be aborted and alter to the Idle state. Therefore, all the information learned will be deleted 
in the tables and a new session needs to be established to exchange the routing 
information. However, the attacker can make this denial of service more efficient by 
exploiting RFD, causing the speaker to be put in a halt state or totally ignored. 
An attacker can exploit UPDATE messages by sending malformed packets. They can set 
in the UPDATE wrong attributes, such as Total Attribute Length, syntactic errors in fields, or 
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missing attributes. In any case, the attacker can play with all the attributes present in those 
messages creating errors in parsing. This will cause the receiving peer to drop the session 
and the same previous scenarios of DoS may occur.  
Moreover, the attacker can send an UPDATE message at any other state than the 
Established one. This will cause the BGP process to return to the Idle state by dropping the 
connection. This is a similar DoS attack that can exploit the RFD option. 
 
NOTIFICATION message Attack 
 
If an attacker can spoof a NOTIFICATION message at any state, they can stop the 
process and turn it to the Idle state. If the peers are already connected, such message can 
cause the connection to be dropped. In such attack, exploiting RFD is possible. Oscillation of 
connections will continue; and the attacker needs to keep sending NOTIFICATION messages. 
This will cause the penalty value in RFD to increase, until the peer is stopped for a while. 
This is one of the types of DoS that can be caused by an attacker. 
 
 
ATTACK SCENARIOS 
 
The previous attacks covered are atomic as described in [33]. However, an attacker 
would want more when attacking the routing infrastructure. These larger goals are 
described in this section as attack scenarios. So, an adversary would use BGP vulnerabilities 
to execute larger attacks that have bigger impact on the Internet itself and its community. S. 
Convery et. al. in [33] split up the attack scenarios into five different goals. This section will 
describe those attack scenarios in a more BGP protocol focused way. 
 
DISABLE A STUB AS 
 
There are many ways an attacker can disable a stub AS. All of the attacks studied that 
relate to a denial of service can be used to disable a stub AS from receiving routing 
information from its ISP multi-homed AS, and routing its packets outside its border. The 
attacker can use SYN flooding to crash the BGP speaker of the target AS. They can use one of 
the BGP messages attack by sending wrong fields in messages or messages at the wrong 
state of the speaker. Moreover, they can use TCP RST attack against the BGP session 
established between the target and the service provider for instance. In addition, they can 
use SYN, SYN ACK and ICMP attacks to achieve a similar goal. Obviously, these attacks need 
to be continuous until they exploit the Route Flap Dampening option to provide the speaker 
with a large penalty value. Therefore, there are many attacks that can be used to cause such 
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goal but generally attackers want more than disabling a stub AS. However, depending on 
the targeted AS, the level of impact increases. 
DISABLE CRITICAL PORTIONS IN THE INTERNET 
 
Many routing attacks can have the objective to disable critical portions in the Internet. 
The criticality depends obviously on the representation of the portion and need of that 
portion in the Internet by the dependent organisation, or even country. This objective can 
be achieved by altering a global internet routing table. This can be done by realising an 
unauthorised route injection attack. This attack will insert unauthorised prefixes into the 
routing table. Then, the attacker must be certain of the propagation of these injected 
unauthorised routes despite the fact that route filtering is applied in many ASes. Then, they 
can repeat this in multiple ASes in different providers. An attacker can establish an 
unauthorised BGP session with a peer instead of conduction the route injection attack. 
Another way to achieve such goal is to disable core critical routers. This attack will have a 
larger impact because of the importance of the target. Majorly, the attacks are of DoS type. 
The adversary can use TCP Reset or message attacks against the BGP process. These will 
cause a denial of service to the session. Otherwise, they can attack the router with SYN 
flooding at port 179 until the memory resources are saturated. Another way is to flood the 
routing table by sending the most specific routes that should be accepted by the upstream 
AS. This will cause the routing tables to flood because of the more specific routes. Since all 
these types of routes are sent, they will be propagated causing a chaos similar to the 
AS7007 incident in 1997 [40]. This attack exploits the routing table memory limitations. All 
these attack scenarios cause a denial of service to a portion of the Internet.  
 
DISABLE A MULTIHOMED AS 
 
To achieve such an objective, the attacker can use any of the previous two attack 
scenarios at a higher scale. This means that the attack will be conducted against many BGP 
speakers. The attacker can disable many stub ASes that are connected to the multihomed 
AS. This way, all the links that are connected with the multihomed AS will be down. The 
attacker can isolate the target from all other peers causing a denial of service to targeted 
multihomed AS and the stub ASes that rely on it. Another technique is to disable the critical 
portions of the multihomed AS’s network. This attack uses the same approach as disabling 
portions of the Internet. It will focus on causing a denial of service on the BGP processes 
relied on by the target.  
 
BLACKHOLE TRAFFIC 
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This type of goal requires a few attacks to be achieved successfully. Blackholing traffic 
means that traffic routed or forwarded will be dropped and will not reach its destination. 
This attack can target a stub AS or an ISP from the outside if the latter relies on a single 
upstream ISP. The attacker can use different techniques in persuading the peer to route all 
the traffic to their router. They can establish an unauthorised BGP session with the target. 
Then, send UPDATE messages that route all traffic through the attacker’s machine. This way, 
the adversary will receive all the packets through their machine and drop all of them, while 
keeping the BGP session live. The targeted AS will forward its traffic to the malicious router 
using the information learnt from it. Another way to achieve this attack is to send spoofed 
BGP UPDATE messages that poison the routing table with more specific unauthorised 
prefixes. This way the decision process of the targeted BGP router will use those new routes 
that lead to nowhere. This creates a sort of blackhole for the traffic originating from the 
targeted AS. 
 
DNS ATTACKS 
 
This goal is the one that is targeted by many attackers. Routing based attacks can be 
used to conduct other ones through the Domain Name System. The first aim would be for 
the adversary to collect personal data of users for instance. After a successful routing attack, 
a malicious individual can attack the DNS and lure traffic towards a compromised web 
server for example. This way, any user, for instance, can use a service where credentials are 
required. The attacker can get hold of them through this scenario [61]. Other more 
damaging attacks can be conducted using interdomain routing as a proxy. For instance, the 
attack can a BGP based attack to masquerade as root DNS servers. This provides the 
attacker with such large flexibility and immense damage they can cause to the internet 
community. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
Most of these attacks and attack scenarios are able to be conducted to disturb the 
functioning of BGP processes. However, they require deep knowledge of BGP routing and 
routing architecture of the target. Most implementers and manufacturers generally declare 
that such attacks have never occurred and are unlikely. However, they did and they can 
happen since there are many cases concerning misconfiguration that have caused almost 
chaos. Nevertheless, the presence of these vulnerabilities in the protocol itself is disturbing. 
The state of BGP security cannot be left as it is and the countermeasures should be included 
in the protocol and not added as extra options for the users. Hence, security requirements 
need to be defined before analysing the solutions that have been put in place to avoid such 
possible attacks that can harm the Internet as a whole. In the next chapter, we examine the 
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security mechanisms used nowadays to endeavour to secure some portions of interdomain 
routing. Moreover, we study the different security requirement needed for better 
functioning of BGP and the security problems required to be solved.
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Chapter 4 
BGP SECURITY 
 
After reviewing the different threats and attacks that can be achieved by exploiting BGP 
vulnerabilities, this chapter presents the current methodologies used by ISPs to secure their 
BGP routing infrastructure. Then, it covers the security requirements needed to minimise 
the issues discussed previously. Moreover, we illustrate the main security problems that 
should be emphasised to provide a protection at the protocol level. 
 
1. CURRENT PROTECTION MECHANISMS FOR BGP 
 
Since BGP is the main protocol used in interdomain routing, securing it by any means 
while research is in progress is a must for all ISPs. Generally, the protection mechanisms 
used nowadays is to protect the TCP session from attacks. Actually, it is not for protection 
but only making it harder for attackers to affect ISPs and their upstream providers and 
downstream customers. Moreover, traffic filtering is used extensively in border routers. 
 
TCP MD5 AUTHENTICATION 
 
TCP MD5 authentication was analysed in the previous chapter. It is not part of the BGP 
protocol and is implemented by most ISPs. As stated in chapter 2, it is used to protect BGP 
sessions against the introduction of spoofed TCP segments into the connection stream. The 
proposed solution is a keyed Hash function or known as Hashed Message Authentication 
Code (HMAC) [42]. It is used for each message exchanged between peers. However, a 
password or key is chosen manually and inputted as such in both ends of the session. 
Considering thousands of routers used concurrently, maintaining shared secrets between 
them is extremely complicated. Furthermore, these shared secrets need to be changed 
regularly or they will be subject to different attacks against the cryptographic function. In 
addition, it will add more complexity to key management, since it is manual. 
 
IPSEC 
 
Although much more effective than the previous solution, it is not widely used by ISPs 
to protect their BGP sessions. This is a protection mechanism for the layer three IP 
datagram. IPsec is widely used for tunnelling VPNs over Internet between endpoints when 
transmitting confidential or important data [43, 44]. This security mechanism can be used to 
protect BGP sessions from Integrity violation, Replay and DoS attacks through its 
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Authentication Header protocol (AH). It can also be extended to an additional confidentiality 
security service via its Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). In addition, it can dynamically 
negotiate secret keys and has an implemented key management mechanism. The latter uses 
the IPsec Internet Security and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [45] and the Internet 
Key Exchange (IKE) [46]. IPsec is used to protect the BGP peering sessions by implementing 
Virtual Private Networks [47]. The implementation of this safeguard is efficient to tackle 
BGP session local vulnerabilities. However, it does not address widespread attacks and 
cannot scale with them. 
 
GENERALISED TTL SECURITY MECHANISM (GTSM)  
 
This is a security mechanism that prevents attackers from remotely sending BGP 
spoofed messages to targets. This mechanism uses the TTL attribute in the IP packet. The 
TTL is a value that is decremented at every hop and if reaches zero (0), the packet is 
dropped. Originally, between BGP peers TTL is set to 1 by the sending router. As illustrated 
in the last chapter in spoofing attacks, an attacker can set the TTL by counting the number 
of hops so that it arrives to the target with the value 1. This mechanism uses a different 
value to be set between peers. Peers that require multi hops to reach each other are rare. 
Thus, GTSM uses a TTL with a value 255 for the sending speaker. The receiving peer needs 
to check that the value of TTL is not less than 254. If it is not the case, the packet is dropped 
or flagged according to the implementation. This will assure that no remote attack can be 
conducted. 
 
The following is a table that shows the efficiency of those three techniques to protect 
peering sessions [49]. 
 
 Integrity DoS prevention Replay 
Prevention 
Confidentiality 
MD5 Integrity Yes No Yes No 
AH (IPsec) Yes Yes Yes No 
ESP (IPsec) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GTSM No No No No 
Table4.1: BGP Peer Session Security Mechanisms 
 
 
SUSPICIOUS TRAFFIC FILTERING 
 
This technique is conducted using defensive routing policies. The latter are used to filter 
out malicious or suspicious announcements. This includes checking for hazardous and risky 
attributes of UPDATE messages. Most ISPs, for example, implement ingress and egress 
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filters derived from routing policies. They use lists of loopback addresses and addresses with 
no match, in a document called Documented Special Use Addresses (DUSA), provided by 
IANA. These filters can parse all BGP messages and especially UPDATE messages to retrieve 
and drop malicious looking packets. This method is a good defence method but this depends 
on the policies and filters which become very messy and hard to control after a while. 
 
2. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
 
The previous solutions used by ISPs to temporarily protect their interdomain routing are 
weak against other attacks. Some of them are quite strong but rely on good management 
and do not protect large scale attacks. Furthermore, in order to protect interdomain 
routing, the solution has to consider many parameters that relate to the protocol itself. 
Thus, there needs to be a few requirements set that define correct operation of BGP as a 
protocol and speakers. This means that any attack against BGP ought to determine a non-
correct operation. The security services that should be provided for proper BGP operation 
are the authenticity, freshness and integrity of the routing information exchanged. In 
addition, a BGP speaker’s decision process, storing and distribution of routing information 
must be in accordance with the BGP specification and routing policies established by ASes 
[50]. 
Initially, high level requirements should be put in place before setting the more detailed 
ones. Firstly, any security architecture must not rely on mutual trust amongst subscribers 
and ISPs. There must be no trust between entities because there are some parties that can 
never be trusted, and those that can be, are prone to error, misconfigurations or can be 
apprehended by a malicious adversary. Secondly, the elements of security solutions must 
exhibit similar dynamics as the parts of BGP they protect. This means that the solution must 
scale within the BGP architecture and protocol. Moreover, it must be backward compatible, 
which means that the deployment of the solution can be incremental. Thirdly, the resources 
required for the solution ought to be in the same range of requirements of memory and 
processing power for BGP. Thus, the solution should demonstrate similar reliability, 
efficiency and performance. Fourthly, the security services described before (i.e. integrity, 
freshness and data origin authentication) must be assured at the traffic itself. For the fifth 
point, BGP routers should be capable of verifying not only the owner of each prefix that 
authorised the origin AS, but also that each succeeding AS in the path has been authorised 
by its predecessor [41]. 
Following the high level needs, more specific requirements can clarify the objectives for 
securing BGP. These requirements are well illustrated in [50] by S. Kent et.al. The main 
concern in BGP is the security of UPDATE messages, since they define the healthiness of 
routing tables. If UPDATE messages are malicious, then the whole routing infrastructure 
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functions wrongly leading to disastrous communication on the Internet. Thus, to ensure 
security, the following requirements need to be realised. Firstly, the UPDATE message 
should be kept integral and authentic. The BGP speaker receiving the UPDATE message must 
be able to validate that it was sent by the intended peer. Moreover, it can verify that the 
message was not modified while in transfer and the routing information is fresh and not 
replayed. Secondly, there must be a mechanism implemented that ensures that the receiver 
of the UPDATE message is the intended one. Thirdly, the receiving speaker must be able to 
verify that the sending peer is authorised to advertise routing information on behalf of its 
AS. As a fourth requirement, there must be a method to verify any prefix advertised in an 
UPDATE that it was authorised by its parent organisation to own that address space. Fifthly, 
a BGP speaker receiving an UPDATE message must be able to verify that the first AS in the 
route was authorised to advertise the prefixes by the owners of their address spaces. 
Another requirement is the ability of a receiving speaker to verify withdrawals. The 
verification encompasses the ability to confirm that the peer before withdrawing the route 
was a legitimate advertiser of that route. Seventhly, a security mechanism needs to be 
applied to make ensure the well functioning or the BGP decision process and operations. 
This covers speaker’s BGP rules, its AS’s routing policies for storage, modification and 
distribution, decision process, and deriving the forwarding table. Finally, the receiving BGP 
speaker must apply correctly its decision process and routing policies to decide whether to 
accept the UPDATE message or reject it. Because the routing policies are not defined in BGP 
and left to the AS’s administration, the last two security requirements are not reliable to 
securing BGP and should be done separately. If they have to be included, the semantics of 
BGP itself need to be changed since the protocol does not address this issue.  
 
3. BGP SECURITY PROBLEMS 
 
 After specifying the security requirements for BGP, security problems can be derived 
from it. These are the current main efforts that are focused on to provide higher security for 
the protocol. From the previously derived requirements, the main focus on securing BGP 
deals with UPDATE messages and the environment that they depend on. As described in 
[41], T. Vardar has provided three main security problems for BGP: Hop Integrity, Origin 
Authentication, and Path Validation. 
 
HOP INTEGRITY 
 
Gouda et.al. define in [51] the state of a computer network providing hop integrity. If a 
router A receives a message M from a router B, the A can check that M was not altered 
during transmission and is not a replay of an old message [51]. However, BGP does not 
provide this service. To do so, it needs to provide Data Integrity and Source Authentication. 
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Messages ought to be verified at each hop to ensure that they have not been altered, 
replayed, destroyed in both an unauthorised and accidental way. As defined previously, 
source authentication represents the validation that the sender of the messages is a 
legitimate one and not an imposter. These are the two services that need to be addressed 
properly to provide hop integrity. 
 
ORIGIN AUTHENTICATION 
 
This represents the evidence that the data received is the one that should be received. 
It represents the validation of claims of address ownership from ASes. This will allow a 
speaker for example to authenticate a BGP peer. Then, it needs to be able to verify that it is 
authorised to advertise routes. Since the Internet is somehow hierarchical in the provision 
of AS numbers and IP addresses and prefixes (Chapter 1), this hierarchy should be kept to 
validate the AS chains of address ownership. This can be used in a PKI (Public Key 
Infrastructure) format or any means that can provide this service.  
 
PATH VALIDATION 
 
As covered in Chapter 2, a BGP UPDATE message contains a prefix and its associated AS 
path to reach it. Path validation should allow that the path of ASes is valid and should reach 
the intended prefix. This means that each BGP speaker in the path must be reachable by the 
previous one. Moreover, each AS present in the path must be authenticated. This ensures 
that a malicious UPDATE that contains false routes will not be used. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
To sum up, although BGP was provided with a few security mechanisms, it has not 
shown that it is safe and secure. Moreover, these mechanisms are independent from the 
protocol and they represent measures applied only by those who want to. Thus, 
mechanisms inclusive to the protocol should be designed and implemented. Thus, the 
security requirements for BGP were defined with the security problems that raise the white 
flag. However, research has brought us a few still debatable solutions to this issue. In the 
next chapter, we examine two major solutions (S-BGP and soBGP). We provide an overview 
of their security mechanisms and how they endeavour to secure interdomain routing and 
the Internet. 
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Chapter 5 
SOLUTIONS FOR SECURING INTERDOMAIN ROUTING 
 
After viewing the different issues surrounding current interdomain routing security in 
chapter 3, the appropriate security requirements of a better functioning border gateway 
protocol was covered in the last chapter. Then, the major security problems were defined. 
Following this, solutions for securing interdomain routing have been researched for many 
years. Some solutions cover many aspects of the protocol and some cover only a few. In this 
chapter, two solutions are defined and explained. Then, we compare them in the next 
chapter providing the advantages and disadvantages of each solution. 
The mechanisms built to secure BGP are numerous. However, we cover the two most 
important and emphasised ones. The first is Secure-BGP (S-BGP) [50]. The concept was 
developed by S. Kent, C. Lynn and K. Seo and published in April 2000. The second one is 
secure origin BGP (soBGP) [57]. It was designed mainly by CISCO engineers and published in 
2003 as a draft for discussion. 
 
1. SECURE-BGP 
 
BGP, as a protocol, has shown many issues concerning messages. The main concern of 
S. Kent et. al. focuses on the different aspects surrounding UPDATE messages. This is due to 
their importance over the healthiness of routing tables. The first subsection describes the 
design overview of the solution. Then, the security mechanisms are covered followed by the 
proposed deployment of S-BGP. 
 
DESIGN OVERVIEW 
 
Secure-BGP is based on three different security mechanisms that endeavour to satisfy 
the BGP security requirements. The S-BGP architecture uses Public Key Infrastructures 
(PKIs), Attestations, and IPsec.  
The first is Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [52]. Key management in a large scale such as 
the Internet necessitates the existence of public key cryptography where every AS is 
provided with a pair of public and private key. This will need a public key infrastructure for 
key management. The hierarchy required will follow the same scheme as the Internet’s. 
Thus, the root Certificate Authority (CA) is IANA/ICANN. The latter provides keys for RIRs 
(i.e. Regional Internet Registries – Chapter 1) which in turn supply keys for major ISPs and so 
on [53]. These asymmetric key pairs are used extensively in many security solutions. This 
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can provide confidentiality but the major concern is integrity and origin authentication. The 
cryptographic mechanism that provides these security services is digital signatures [25]. 
When a speaker sends a message, it signs it with its private key (i.e. signature key). When 
the peer receives it, it can verify it with the public key (i.e. verification key) of the sending 
speaker. S-BGP considers the use of Digital Signatures with appendix. The latter includes 
hashing the message and signing the digest itself. This will decrease processing power and 
memory usage. PKI and digital signatures will help provide secure identification of BGP 
speakers, ASes and address blocks. Moreover, it will support AS number ownership and BGP 
router authorisation to represent an AS. 
The second entity S-BGP relies on is the use of Attestations. The latter form a trivial 
part of S-BGP since they are used to encapsulate authorisation information within UPDATE 
messages. This will use digital signatures ensuring authenticity and integrity of data 
provided in those messages. Moreover, they will be utilised to check that each AS along the 
path had been authorised to advertise the route by the previous AS. In addition, attestations 
will be used to verify that the advertising AS was authorised by the owners of the IP prefixes 
contained in UPDATE message to advertise them. For backward compatibility, attestations 
ought to be carried in an optional transitive attribute. It will contain digital signatures 
covering the whole route. Since there are two objectives, two types of attestations will be 
required. The first type is Route Attestations and issued by ASes. The second type is 
Address Attestations and issued by the organisation that owns the prefix. Further 
explanation is provided in the next section. 
The third component is IPsec. It is used to secure point-to-point communication 
between BGP speakers. As stated in the last chapter, it provides different services: integrity, 
anti-replay and anti-DoS attacks. These are the security services required for update 
messages. Confidentiality can be provided by IPsec but it is not a fundamental requirement 
for interdomain routing itself. It is applied at the IP layer and can detect quickly DoS and 
replay attacks. It has proven great stability when implemented and used in VPNs (Virtual 
Private Networks). 
 
PROPOSED SECURITY MECHANISMS 
 
As stated in the last section, the approach adopted encompasses PKIs, Attestations and 
IPsec. It involves two Public Key Infrastructures and a new attribute enclosing attestations. 
Moreover, it includes the use of IPsec. These modules are used by every BGP speaker to 
fulfil the security requirements. This section covers in more detail these security 
mechanisms implemented in S-BGP. 
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PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURES (PKIS) AND CERTIFICATES 
 
S-BGP relies on the use of PKIs, based on X.509 (version 3) certificates [54, 55]. They use 
the hierarchy and delegation present in the Internet, starting at the top of the pyramid 
IANA/ICANN and then the regional registries followed by major ISPs and so on. Having the 
PKIs matching the same infrastructure as the Internet authoritative system saves a lot of 
time and a large cost. Moreover, it keeps the solution away from trust issues which is a 
major concern in PKIs. As shown in Figure5.1, ICANN/IANA delegates its authority to its 
regional registries RIRs. The latter do the same to Large ISPs, then to DSPs or organisations. 
IANA/ICANN or RIRs can directly assign public key pairs to organisations depending on the 
circumstances. 
 
 
Figure5.1: PKI Delegation Hierarchy and Allocation Structure 
 
There are two different PKIs used in S-BGP. The first one is a PKI for Address Allocation 
which is used to issue certificates relating to address assignments. The second is a PKI for 
Assignment of ASes and Router Association. This is responsible to provide the authority level 
of speakers and ASes through certificates. 
 
Address Allocation PKI 
 
This PKI is used to issue certificates to each organisation that is given rights of a portion 
of the IP address space. It mirrors the same hierarchy as the Internet. This means that the 
root CA is IANA/ICANN followed by RIRs. The RIRs delegate authority to corresponding ISPs 
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(Internet Service Providers), DSPs (Data Service Providers) and end users. This architecture 
does not require that an address assignment has to be signed and certified by all the upper 
hierarchy since it is a delegated authority. If an ISP provides and certifies an address space 
for its customer, the latter does not require certification from registries or the root CA (i.e. 
ICANN). Moreover, any subscriber or DSP that does not contribute in BGP routing 
information exchanges is not issued with a certificate. 
As address blocks are assigned to organisations, certificates are done in a similar 
manner. Every address block is bound to a public key that belongs to its organisation. These 
certificates provide proof of ownership of the address blocks. Every certificate encloses an 
extension specifying the set of address blocks allocated to the ISP, DSP or subscribers. 
Hence, ICANN, as the root CA, issues itself a certificate asserting ownership of all the IP 
address space on the Internet, as shown in Table5.1. Then, it issues certificates for RIRs and 
hands over IP address blocks to them, as illustrated in Figure5.2 [56]. RIRs are consequently 
given authority to certify ISPs, DSPs or subscribers that are directly linked to them (i.e. they 
directly assigned address blocks to them). A RIR assigns address blocks and certifies for 
example an ISP with address blocks. In turn, the ISP is delegated and has the authority to 
assign IP address blocks to its customers and those that use BGP are provided with a 
suitable certificate. 
 
 
Figure5.2: Certification path in Address Allocation PKI 
 
 
Type Subject Signer 
Root ICANN ICANN 
Registry RIRs ICANN 
ISP/DSP ISP/DSP RIRs/ICANN 
DSP/Subscriber DSP/Subscriber ISP/RIRs/ICANN 
Table5.1: Address Allocation PKI Certificates 
 
 
AS Assignments and Router Association PKI 
 
For this PKI, three certificates will be required. The first two are used to authenticate 
ASes and BGP speakers; and the third is used for the authentication of the relationship 
between those two entities (i.e. ASes and speakers). For this PKI, the hierarchy of authority 
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is a bit different. The root CA stays ICANN and the RIRs come after it. Nevertheless, the third 
tier contains organisations that own ASes. Then, it is followed by a tier containing AS 
numbers and routers, as illustrated in Table5.2. 
 
 
Type Subject Issuer/Signer Extensions 
Root ICANN ICANN All AS numbers 
Registry RIRs ICANN Allocated AS numbers 
AS Owner ISP/DSP/Subscriber RIRs/ICANN Allocated AS numbers 
AS AS DNS number ISP/RIRs/Subscriber AS number 
BGP Speaker BGP Speaker DNS 
name 
ISP/RIRs/Subscriber AS number and Router ID 
Table5.2: AS and Speaker PKI Certificates 
 
 
The assignment process is similar to the one used for the previous PKI. At the top of the 
hierarchy and root of trust is ICANN, as shown in Figure5.3 [56]. It assigns AS numbers to 
RIRs, which in turn assign ASes to the third tier which is composed of ISPs, DSPs and also 
Subscribers, also called AS owners. They in turn provide certificates for authenticated ASes. 
Moreover, they issue certificates for BGP speakers that encompass the AS number, router 
name and router ID. This proves that the BGP speaker belongs to the AS it is originating 
from. 
 
 
Figure5.3: Certification paths in AS number and BGP speaker identification PKI 
 
 
ATTESTATIONS 
 
After covering the different PKIs required for S-BGP, the goal of the asymmetric key 
management infrastructure is to use the certificates and keys to build Attestations. The 
objective is to prove that the AS that made the attestation is authorised by its issuer to 
advertise a path only in accordance to a specific address space. As defined by S. Kent et. al. 
in [50], there are two classes of attestations: Address Attestations (AA) and Route 
Attestations (RA).  
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Address Attestations are used to ensure that the advertising AS is authorised to send 
UPDATE messages. The organisation or the AS owner signs the AA, containing the AS as a 
subject, with its private key. It also provides its Certificate containing its public key with the 
AA. The AS Owner confirms that the AS is authorised to announce certain IP blocks of 
address space. This proves that the organisation in effect owns the address space. Thus, the 
receiver has the ability to verify the certificate, and then validate the signature within the 
AA. If there are many ASes per organisation, everyone should be provided with its own AA 
since each of them has its own address space and represents a different entity in the routing 
infrastructure. 
Route attestations are carried in a new BGP optional attribute added to the UPDATE 
message. For this type of attestation, the subject has to be a transit AS. It can be signed 
offline by the management of the AS. However, it is preferred to be dynamically signed by 
the S-BGP speaker, by using the AS Assignments and Router Association PKI. It uses the 
private key that corresponds to the certificate that binds the BGP speaker to the subject AS 
to sign the RA. As described in [49] and shown in Figure5.4, a RA can result in an “onion 
style” attestation containing signatures from all routers along the path. When a speaker 
receives an UPDATE message, it validates it then signs it before sending it to its peer. When 
its peer receives it, it does the same before advertising it. This way, RAs provide path 
authentication. 
 
 
Figure5.4: Route Attestations [49] 
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ROUTE VALIDATION 
 
To validate a route, attestations and certificates are used in conjunction to verify the 
chain or attestations in the path. This starts from the last AS that advertised the route to the 
first one. When the first one is validated, it means that each subsequent AS in the path has 
been authorised to advertise the route for the appropriate address blocks by the previous 
AS along the path. 
For an AS to verify and validate a route received from its preceding AS, there needs to 
be four components available. First, there has to be one AA from every organisation owning 
an address block in the Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI). The second entity is 
the certificates that have to be included with each AA. Thirdly, RAs from every speaker or AS 
which are present in the path need to be provided. The last entity is the certificates specific 
to route attestations. When a speaker receives an update, it uses the certificates provided 
with AAs to check if every AS or speaker has been given the authority to advertise a route in 
the address space provided in the UPDATE message. Then, it uses the second certificates to 
verify RAs one by one until it arrives to the source AS. All the certificates are checked against 
all relevant Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). CRLs are lists of certificates that are expired 
and must no longer be used. If a certificate is found in a CRL, the route is ignored and the 
UPDATE is dropped. 
Attestations are only used for route advertisement. They are not used for route 
withdrawals since the authorisation of advertisement was already verified at the time of the 
UPDATES registered in Loc-RIB. Furthermore, if a BGP speaker is no longer authorised to 
advertise a route, the latter is no longer valid and ought to be removed. S. Kent et. al. state 
that the way to protect route withdrawal replay or spoofing is to use the IPsec on inter-
router communication. 
IPSEC 
 
S-BGP has been armed with IPsec to overcome the issues of replay attacks; spoofed, 
lost or malformed packets based attacks. This aims at protecting the issues encountered 
with TCP is based attacks in the lower layer (i.e. Internet/Network Layer). The major 
problem with employing IPsec is key management. Since S-BGP provides the required PKI, 
the one established for BGP speaker and AS authentication is enough to provide the 
necessary certificates. S-BGP will use Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) with NULL for 
encryption. This will provide authentication, data integrity and anti-replay mechanisms for 
the BGP session established. Authentication Header was not selected because the author 
claimed that it was not efficient. Internet Key Exchange will be used for dynamic key 
establishment and exchange, which will provided an added value of security comparing to 
the previous TCP MD5 authentication. 
58 
 
PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM 
 
In order to deploy S-BGP effectively, collaboration of many groups in the Internet 
community needs to take place. First of all, main ISPs are obliged to implement the security 
mechanisms of S-BGP. Furthermore, ISPs and subscribers need to generate and distribute 
AAs in a collaborative way. IANA/ICANN needs to improve its system in order to generate 
certificates for ASes. RIRs are given the same responsibility and thus required enhancement 
of their processing and storage. In addition, BGP speakers need to be upgraded with 
supplementary storage and their software needs to be upgraded to support the security 
mechanisms. 
S-BGP is incrementally deployable. However, non-neighbour ASes will have issues in 
exchanging RAs because of the required storage. The latter ASes will not have sufficient 
storage in their RIBs. However, neighbour ASes will gain full advantage of S-BGP from 
deployment. Moreover, because of the hierarchy imposed in S-BGP, only contiguous 
deployment ought to be attempted because of the complexity of a random non-contiguous 
one. Furthermore, if an AS switches one of its border routers to S-BGP, all the other should 
follow. This is required in order to preserve a regular and steady view of exterior routes. 
Moreover, this will avoid occurrence of loops to the AS. 
 
2. SECURE ORIGIN BGP 
 
After covering S-BGP, the other well-known solution is secure origin BGP (soBGP). 
soBGP covers roughly similar issues as S-BGP. The main concern of R. White et. al. is to deal 
with UPDATE messages and authenticity of the route advertised. Similar to S-BGP, we first 
cover the design overview of soBGP. Then, we describe in detail the security mechanisms or 
countermeasures adopted followed by the proposed deployment of such solution. 
 
DESIGN OVERVIEW 
 
Secure origin BGP was not designed to overcome the security issues of the 
communication between routers. Instead soBGP proposes the ability of a speaker to verify 
the authorisation of an AS to advertise IP address blocks, which is a similar aim of S-BGP. 
Moreover, it endeavours to validate the path from the advertising speaker to the receiving 
end. This is also a similar approach to S-BGP which is route validation. In addition, soBGP 
aims to verify the policies of the originating AS regarding any particular block of IP addresses 
[57].  
Similar to S-BGP, secure origin BGP requires a key distribution mechanism similar to 
Public Key Infrastructure. First, to authenticate each participant, soBGP will use a certificate 
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that binds an AS number to a public key matching a private key to be used for signing other 
certificates. Second, the solution will include a way to verify that an AS is authorised to 
advertise a certain address block. Same for this situation, a certificate needs to be created 
that binds an AS to the IP address blocks that it is allowed to advertise. The design of soBGP 
contains three types of certificates. The last one is unique compared to S-BGP and it relates 
to the BGP policies. It is a certificate that describes policies related to specific blocks of 
addresses. In addition, it relates the connections between the advertising AS and its 
neighbours [60]. 
For a speaker to validate a path, a different approach is taken by soBGP. The design 
considers building a topology map of the paths of the entire internetwork. Every AS in the 
internetwork needs to build a certificate that includes a list of all its peers. Then, after 
considering a list of all transit peers, the outcome is a map of the AS entities in the 
internetwork [60]. Moreover, soBGP tries to take advantage of the existing Internet 
Architecture. It uses for example the trust relationships, loose AS associations and more. 
Furthermore, secure origin BGP has designed its protocol in a way that a new type of 
message for BGP is required. It aims at creating a security based message.  
 
PROPOSED SECURITY MECHANISMS 
 
As stated in the last section, the approach adopted encompasses key distribution 
system and different certificates. The key distribution system manages three types of 
certificates. The first aims at authenticating ASes. The second provides the authorisation 
mechanism. The third provides extra security to policies and ASes relationships. Moreover, a 
fourth certificate provides a way to build an internetwork topology map.  This section covers 
in more detail these security mechanisms implemented in soBGP. 
 
AS AUTHENTICATION 
 
The most important point to start with is to have a secure way of authenticating peers. 
soBGP overcomes this issue through the use of a certificate dedicated for AS authentication 
between peers. This certificate is called Entity Certification, or EntityCert [60]. An EntityCert 
binds an AS number to a public key(s). The key created is an asymmetric public/private key 
pair. The private key that corresponds to the public one is used by the AS to sign a range of 
other certificates. EntityCert is classified as an X.509v3 certificate similar to the ones used by 
IPsec. In order to know that the key provided in the certificate is effectively the one of the 
advertising AS, soBGP involves a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to approve and sign EntityCert. 
WEB OF TRUST 
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Since a TTP needs to be involved, there is a problem of creation of the trust. If there 
needs to be a signature from a trusted party, which entity signs the EntityCert of that 
trusted party? If we follow this chain, the “chicken and egg” causality dilemma rises. soBGP 
uses a concept that more or less covers this issue. A number of keys is distributed and 
configured manually to have a high level of trust. They are completely trusted by any AS 
since they were verified and authenticated beforehand, such as top-level backbone service 
providers and key authentication service providers [60]. As shown in Figure5.5, the trusted 
AS can used its key to sign EntityCerts of other validated ASes. Then, the web of trust can 
start where the new trusted ASes can sign other ASes entity certificates after validating their 
authenticity. This way, these EntityCerts will form a web of trust based on top-level trusted 
entities. 
 
 
Figure5.5: Web of Trust in soBGP [57] 
 
 
ADVERTISEMENT AUTHORISATION 
 
Having the web of trust in place with EntityCerts provided for ASes, providing a proof 
for each AS that they are authorised to advertise certain block of addresses is the next step. 
soBGP uses another certificate to provide this security service. Authorisation Certificates or 
AuthCerts are used to bind an AS to the IP address space able to advertise [60]. Figure5.6 
[57] illustrates an example of AuthCerts. In this example, the top AS gave the authorisation 
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to AS number 65000 to advertise the prefix 10.0.0.0/8 by signing the authorisation 
certificate with its private key. Then, AS 65000 has the ability to delegate part of its address 
block to another AS. AS 65000 binds AS 65001 to the address space 10.1.0.0/16, by signing 
an AuthCert with its private key. This means that AS 65001 now has the ability to advertise 
within its address space. This is a delegation from AS to AS 65000 and from AS 65000 to AS 
65001. The latter can also do the same as seen in Figure5.6 [57]. 
This way, any speaker or AS receiving these AuthCerts can verify with the public key of 
each AS the authenticity of AS and the delegation process provided to AS 65000, AS 650001 
and AS 65002. This means that the speaker can check the validity of the authorisation by 
verifying up through the chain until it reaches the top AS, which is trusted or can be verified 
through its EntityCert. 
To minimise the number of certificates, soBGP allows certifying blocks of addresses 
rather than prefixes within them. Hence, this will reduce the processing power and storage 
capacity required for ASes. soBGP also allows certifying single prefixes which can conclude 
into as many authorisation certificates as required. 
 
 
Figure5.6: Advertisement Authorisation Mechanism Example [57] 
 
POLICY CERTIFICATE 
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Secure origin BGP provides a higher depth for its certifications. Authorisation 
certificates are not advertised independently, but encapsulated into certificates that include 
a set of policies the originator enforces to the advertised prefixes. PrefixPolicyCerts enclose 
an authorisation certificate, the policies applied to the prefix within the certificate, and a 
signature signed by the authorised AS.  
The policies that can be included are unlimited. They can include a list containing ASes 
not allowed to be present in a path destined to the address block. Moreover, it can include 
the maximum length of the prefix that can be allowed. The policies are versatile and flexible. 
The issue with them is the ability of enforcement of those policies received by other ASes. 
For a better functioning of this security mechanism, all ASes should follow with a ‘MUST 
COMPLY’ to prefix policies principle. 
 
TOPOLOGY MAP 
 
Secure origin BGP designed a way to verify that a given advertiser AS of a route has a 
real path to the destination. This is also solved through the use of certificates named 
ASPocilyCerts. Every AS creates this certificate by signing with its private key a list of its 
peers. This way, an internetwork topology map is assembled, as shown in Figure5.7 [57]. In 
the diagram below for example, AS 65003 sends an UPDATE message to AS 65005 claiming 
it is capable of reaching AS 65004 through the path {65003, 65001, 65004}. The receiving AS 
(i.e. AS 65005) can verify that AS 65003 has revealed concrete information. AS 65005 checks 
the ASPolicyCert of AS 65003 ensuring that it is connected to AS 65001, then the 
ASPolicyCert of AS 65001 validating that it is connected to AS 65003. It continues with a 
similar check for the link between AS 65001 and AS 65004 through both of their 
ASPolicyCerts. This way, it ensures that similar information is provided from both sides of 
the link and accepts the UPDATE. If the information provided by a speaker is wrong, the 
message will be directly dropped. 
In addition, the use of this procedure can increase the level of flexibility through the 
addition of policies. This mutual similarity check can be combined with policy statements. 
For instance and following our previous example, AS 65001 can have a non-transit policy. 
This means that if AS 65003 sent the same AS 65004 reachability path (i.e. {65003, 65001, 
65004}) to AS 65005, the path is wrong since AS 65001 does not allow transit traffic to flow. 
When AS 65005 starts checking ASPolicyCerts, it will know that AS 65001 has a no-transit 
policy and therefore the path is not valid. The receiving AS will drop the UPDATE message 
immediately. 
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Figure5.7: Connectivity Topology Map Example [57] 
 
 
COMMUNICATING CERTIFICATES 
 
All the previous mechanisms have been discussed. They comprised of a set of 
certificates able to provide many security services relating to BGP. The only point left is the 
way these certificates will be communicated. Secure origin BGP designed a new BGP 
message that handles the transportation of those security mechanisms. The new SECURITY 
message is to be used to carry specifically soBGP certificates [58]. 
Prior to starting a BGP session, peers may negotiate and decide on the exchange of 
SECURITY messages. When the latter is negotiated and accepted, a SEURITY option message 
must be exchanged before any certificates or any other information is sent. Then, the 
speakers exchange the soBGP certificates in their local database. J. Ng has provided a more 
detailed explanation of what SECURITY message contains in [58]. 
 
 
PROPOSED DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM 
 
Secure origin BGP provides three different examples of the way to deploy the solution. 
soBGP wants to prove that it can provide various options since it is not dependant on 
transportation nor on a yet to be built centralised set of servers. Majorly, soBGP 
deployment encompasses the distribution and supply of certificates [59]. 
The first proposed option requires routers to be able to conduct cryptographic 
functions and validate them (i.e. certificates and signatures validation). The certificate 
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exchange will be done between peers themselves. Then, they must be able to validate them 
and carry all the mechanisms required by soBGP [57]. 
The second solution is meant for a situation when routers are not able to conduct 
cryptographic functions or the processing is too slow. BGP speakers would only exchange 
certificates and forward them to internal servers. The latter will verify and validate all 
received certificates. When a border router receives an UPDATE message, it can query the 
appropriate server for the validity of the message. Then, the speaker can proceed 
depending on the reply of the server [49]. 
The final proposed option does not rely on the routers forwarding security information 
to servers. However, internal servers communicate directly via a multi-hop session. This 
way, they can exchange certificates and process them. Then, border routers query the 
servers to validate receive UPDATE messages. 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
After covering those two solutions, S-BGP and soBGP provide differently their security 
countermeasures. Although they use the same primitives they rely on different 
architectures and designs. Therefore, both of them perform differently and secure the 
protocol differently. In the next chapter, we look at cover similarities and differences of 
these protocols in many parts of the solutions. Moreover, we provide qualities and 
drawbacks of S-BGP and soBGP along the way. 
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Chapter 6 
S-BGP VS. SOBGP 
 
After describing two actively researched solutions for securing interdomain routing, we 
need to compare them. The comparison includes the similarities and differences of those 
two protocols. It covers to what extent the security requirements are met through the 
different mechanisms involved. Moreover, we provide the residual vulnerabilities left when 
deploying each solution. After that, deployment and performance issues are examined. In 
the comparison, we analyse along the way advantages and disadvantages in each section. 
 
1. SECURITY MECHANISMS 
 
S-BGP and soBGP were designed to overcome certain security issues in interdomain 
routing. They both tackle the problems differently with a few similarities. In this section, we 
discuss the similarities and differences of the security mechanisms used in these protocols. 
 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS 
 
S-BGP and soBGP both rely on the use of the same cryptographic mechanisms to build 
the entities that form the security modules. They both rely on asymmetric cryptographic 
functions. They use digital signatures to sign data and produce certificates. This is used to 
provide data origin authentication of the information exchanged. Every AS would be 
required having a public/private key pair. 
In S-BGP, it is essential for an S-BGP speaker to be able to sign messages (i.e. conduct 
digital signatures on data). The requirement is mandatory because speakers are required to 
dynamically sign all S-BGP UPDATE messages. Moreover, they must have also the ability to 
verify and validate messages. This is one of the main issues of S-BGP because it will 
necessitate more processing power and a lot of storage when deployed. Thus, the level of 
security is higher but at an elevated cost.  
However, soBGP does not obligate its speakers to have the ability to conduct excessive 
cryptographic operations. First of all because it does not dynamically sign UPDATE messages 
but uses a new SECURITY message. Secondly, it has different options of deployment that can 
prevent speakers from performing digital signatures and verifications. This way, soBGP is 
lighter but the security mechanism is not as dynamic as the one applied in S-BGP. 
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Therefore, S-BGP and soBGP rely on the same cryptographic primitives. However, the 
extensiveness of their use is dissimilar. While S-BGP requires a signature at every UPDATE, 
soBGP has a set of certificates that it uses in a relatively more static manner. We can state 
that, obviously, there is a tradeoff between security and cost. 
 
KEY DISTRIBUTION 
 
For both of these solutions, key distribution is a key factor to both the security and 
deployment aspects. Although the certificate type is similar for both (i.e. X.509v3), S-BGP 
and soBGP use different mechanisms for distribution. The difference occurred perhaps 
because of the historic issues discussed on the method used for S-BGP. However, there are 
issues on both sides. 
S-BGP uses two different PKIs but parallel to each other. The first is the address 
allocation PKI, used to deploy asymmetric key pairs. The latter are used to generate 
certificates and most importantly Address Attestations. They aim to provide origin 
authentication by binding the address bock(s) to the source AS. The second PKI is used to 
assign ASes and bind routers and organisations to them. This aim is fulfilled through the use 
of certificates. Moreover, the keys provided by this PKI are used to sign Route Attestations 
which provide route validation. The issue regarding the approach taken by S-BGP is that it 
relies on a single point of trust. Following the hierarchy of authority in the Internet, it is the 
best way to apply a PKI since the infrastructure of authority is already present. However, the 
issue that rises is the possibility of one of the entities in the top of the pyramid to be 
compromised. For instance, if the private key of IANA/ICANN is compromised, attackers can 
create their own public private keys with their own AS number and IP prefix. This has a very 
low probability of occurrence, but still is a possibility. Moreover, the cost of PKI is very high 
and requires extra storage and special hardware for critical organisations, such as HSMs 
(Hardware Security Modules). 
Secure origin BGP uses a rather different approach. It relies on a distributed web of 
trust. It starts with initial trusted certificates in key organisations. Then, using those 
certificates, trust is provided to other entities, realising a web of trust. The advantage of this 
model is that it provides distributed responsibility. This avoids the single point of trust issue 
that SBGP has with its PKI. However, the trust model is fuzzy. The conditions or trust model 
does not provide a certificate. In this web of trust, signatures have unclear semantics. 
Moreover, the issue is that transitive trust is assumed and allowed. Although flexible, this 
makes the web of trust weak and vulnerable to malicious users or intruders to the system. 
To sum up, PKIs in S-BGP offer better security level than soBGP. However, they are 
more complex and expensive to implement and deploy. Although, the web of trust of soBGP 
is more flexible and avoids the issue of a single point of failure; the trust is distributed and 
therefore harder to manage and quantify the security level. Moreover, its definition is still 
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fuzzy and the security level is still debatable. Yet again, there is a tradeoff issue between 
security, complexity and cost. However, S-BGP is better suited for key distribution. 
 
SECURITY ENTITIES EXCHANGE 
 
S-BGP and soBGP have different ways to transport the new security related data. This is 
a crucial point because the requirement for both solutions is to be able to adhere to the 
backward compatibility principle. 
Secure origin BGP uses a new SECURITY message. This is message will be used to 
transport security related data (i.e. certificates) to peers. The advantage of this is that it 
does not interfere with the BGP-4 protocol. All four messages stay the same and no change 
will be applied. However, a new message appears and requires addition to the protocol. 
Thus, it will require special negotiation with routers that use soBGP. If this is not conducted 
carefully, many routers will receive SECURITY messages that they do not understand and 
therefore drop the session. This will cause RFD which will in turn generate a denial of 
service.  
Secure-BGP, in turn, uses a different approach. It adds a new attribute to the UPDATE 
message that would transport its certificates and signatures. The advantage of this approach 
is that no new message is added to the protocol and speakers need not to be updated. 
Moreover, the attribute is optional transitive. This means that it will be transported to the 
speakers that might use it. Furthermore, no additional negotiation needs to be established 
concerning the messages exchanged. In addition, S-BGP signs all its messages, providing 
dynamic data origin authentication. 
Therefore, the best solution that does not require additional design issues is S-BGP new 
path attribute. However, in terms of performance, soBGP does better. In terms of security 
level, S-BGP provides a better dynamically signed message. Nevertheless, every message 
required cryptographic processing, which leads to more processing power and memory 
needed.  
 
2. SECURITY ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
Both of these protocols were designed to overcome the issues that surround 
interdomain routing security. The fact that they have been designed differently, the led to 
different security achievements. 
S-BGP uses its mechanisms to overcome the security issues discussed in Chapter 4. 
Origin authentication is provided by utilising PKI and AAs. In S-BGP, address attestations are 
used to authenticate organisation’s ownership of IP addresses. Path validation is 
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accomplished through RAs. These attestations are used to verify the path information by a 
transit AS. When these are combined with certificates from the PKIs, a speaker becomes 
able to authenticate every AS in the path and its authority to advertise the address blocks in 
the UPDATE message. In addition, hop integrity is supplied through IPsec with integrity and 
source authentication for every hop. However, there are other issues that are not covered 
so far by this protocol. Route withdrawal is not covered by the security mechanisms 
adopted by S-BGP. Moreover, there is the issue of the requirement of route updates.  
Compared to S-BGP, soBGP is a lightweight solution. Similar to S-BGP, it relies on strong 
security mechanisms such as certificates and signatures. It provides source authentication of 
messages through its entity certification. However, there is still the issue of integrity of 
messages which is not ensured since it uses the new SECURITY message. Route validation is 
met at a very weak level. soBGP provides a static path plausibility rather than authenticity. 
Moreover, it does not provide hop integrity, claiming in the paper that it was not part of the 
problem [57]. Although it provides a policy checking mechanisms, it becomes more complex 
when more policies come into play. Furthermore, both path authentication and policy 
checking require an additional topology database and policy database respectively. This 
would increase complexity and dependence on many entities.   
In terms of level of security, S-BGP dramatically takes the lead. Although it has not 
covered all of the issues, it provides well structured and secure measures. The issue with S-
BGP is complexity, especially with the PKIs. As quoted by Prof. S. M. Bellovin: “Complexity is 
the enemy of Security”, the issue that S-BGP encounters is cost and ability of routers used 
nowadays to scale with its performance requirements. However, soBGP is more lightweight 
and therefore is a better choice on this side. However, it failed to even provide a proper 
path authentication, which is a crucial part of the protocol. While S-BGP protects against 
attacks anywhere along the path, soBGP can only protect against attacks or 
misconfigurations done by the originator of a prefix announcement.  
 
3. RESIDUAL VULNERABILITIES 
 
Both solutions aimed at providing certain security measures that should surmount the 
vulnerabilities present in BGP. They both succeeded in some aspects. However, they failed 
to achieve some of their goals. 
Route withdrawal in S-BGP is not protected by any means. A malicious BGP speaker is 
able to delete routes if it can spoof a session with an ordinary speaker. The use of IPsec can 
detect replay attacks that lead to loss or disorder of packets. However, if a speaker is 
compromised, no mechanism forces it to transmit UPDATES, especially for route 
withdrawal. Although it is not a priority, passive sniffing is not protected by the protocol. It 
can be, if ESP in IPsec is enabled which provides confidentiality. RAs (Route Attestations) 
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provide proof of validity of routes. However, they do expire. This is an issue because routes 
withdrawn can be reasserted by a malicious speaker. This is because BGP does not protect 
the sequencing of UPDATE messages through sequence numbers for instance. This issue can 
be overcome, if a mechanism and a database, similar to the CRL one, is included for expired 
attestations. In addition, ensuring that BGP speakers, exchanging UPDATEs, are applying 
BGP rules and policies accordingly is not addressed by S-BGP [50]. 
Secure origin BGP has succeeded only in a few aspects. However, there are many issues 
that have been weakly overcome, or left untouched. soBGP does not protect the hop 
integrity. This means that it does not indicate any mechanism that can be used to guard 
peering sessions. Moreover, it claims that it provides path authentication or validity. 
However, it only provides plausible paths statically authenticated. This means that 
guarantee for security is very low. soBGP works through certificates transported in the new 
SECURITY message. Therefore, UPDATE messages are not authenticated and can be 
replayed or misused. In addition, soBGP does not provide a mechanism that identifies bad 
certificates, like CRLs for S-BGP. The issue that arises is how it will deal with certificates that 
are expired or reported to have been used maliciously. Finally, as S-BGP, soBGP does not 
provide a mechanism that overcomes passive wiretapping, correct application of policies, 
and some replay attacks. 
To sum up, there are still residual vulnerabilities for both protocols. However, they are 
clearer in S-BGP and some solutions for them have been given in the definition. Although 
soBGP tries to include policies in its solution, it fails in providing the most important security 
service which is path validation. Moreover, it does not protect peering sessions and all 
residual vulnerabilities of S-BGP apply to it as well.  
 
4. DEPLOYMENT  
 
After designing and implementing a solution, it needs to be deployed. It is one of the 
most crucial points of interdomain routing because of the large scale of the Internet. Both 
soBGP and S-BGP are incrementally deployable. However, they both hold a nebulous 
effectiveness when deployed incrementally. They cannot succeed completely, until fully 
deployed. 
The major issue surrounding S-BGP deployment is performance. This solution requires 
most entities that play a role in interdomain routing to be enhanced. Routers should be 
upgraded in memory, processing power, storage, and with the security mechanisms 
required (i.e. new attribute including the processing mechanisms). ISPs and DSPs should also 
include safe key management. The cost of this is high and requires special hardware such as 
HSMs. Moreover, Registries and ICANN need to be protected immensely and provided with 
storage requirements for the keys and certificates. In addition, collaboration of many groups 
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in the Internet community needs to take place. S-BGP is less incrementally deployable since 
it requires at least a few tiers in the hierarchical pyramid to be fully operational [67]. 
soBGP provides three different ways for deployment. It is more flexible than S-BGP 
since it is able not to rely on routers. It can use extra servers in each AS that can perform the 
validation of the different certificates. Moreover, it is really incrementally deployable 
because it only requires a few speakers to be given prior trust to. Although, the security is 
soft and still debatable, it requires less expensive cryptographic functions. These options 
grant soBGP greater ease and flexibility of deployment. However, this can create 
interoperability issues [66]. 
The flexibility of deployment of soBGP gave it a plus in comparison to S-BGP. The latter 
requires many prerequisites before it can be operational. However, soBGP can become fully 
operational without the need of as many requirements as S-BGP. Although soBGP shows 
quicker deployment, the latter is fuzzy and can lead to issues of interoperability in peering 
sessions. Coming back to our point, more security leads to more complexity. Thus, S-BGP 
offers greater security level than soBGP but the expense for deploying it is much higher. 
 
5. PERFORMANCE 
 
Generally, performance degrades when offering security services. S-BGP and soBGP try 
to overcome the security issues with less impact on the performance on BGP. However and 
not surprisingly, it is not the case for both of them, although one performs faster than the 
other. 
Although S-BGP provides the most complete security solution compared to soBGP, it 
performs disastrously. First of all, S-BGP requires extensive cryptography at every message 
sent. A performance study regarding S-BGP has found that the added overhead is equivalent 
to the processing power (CPU) and memory provided by a personal computer [67]. Thus, the 
hardware requirement is not that large. However, the security added will require more 
bandwidth in order to perform at the BGP standard. Moreover, transmission bandwidth 
required can increase dramatically. Obviously, the overhead is higher in large ISPs because 
they are prompted and queried more than other organisations. On the whole, S-BGP is the 
best solution in terms of meeting the security requirements; but this pays the price. It 
performs much slower and requires more resources. 
On the contrary, soBGP performs faster. It tries to mitigate the cost of signatures by 
long term authentication of routing elements. All authenticated data is signed, validated and 
stored at routers before starting the peering sessions. Moreover, all security related data is 
transported in a new message. soBGP does not extensively signs all updates and exchanges 
like S-BGP. Thus, the performance of soBGP is higher. Moreover, certificates are validated 
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locally rather than through a PKI. Although the security is defined as soft and questionable, 
it gives advantage to soBGP on performance over S-BGP. 
Thus, soBGP is more lightweight than S-BGP. This gives it a better performance in terms 
of processing power, memory and bandwidth. However, this has to pay the price of an 
unclear security level. S-BGP provides the most complete solution for securing interdomain 
routing. However, it is still questionable whether their resources requirements are much 
heavier than the infrastructure can sustain. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
After comparing both S-BGP and soBGP, it is vital to come up with a conclusion about 
the solutions. In terms of security, S-BGP is far more complete than soBGP. It provides clear 
security requirements that work well theoretically. It arms BGP with security mechanisms 
that authenticate dynamically the path and ASes. Moreover, it uses IPsec for peer-to-peer 
communication. However, the complexity in S-BGP is immense. This leads to slow 
performance and convergence. Moreover, deployment for S-BGP is still questionable about 
its practicality. Although soBGP is lightweight and overcomes some of these performance 
issues, it only provides good origin authentication of ASes. Moreover, it does not afford 
dynamic path authentication. It can only cover a static path plausibility service. This means 
that paths can be changed and an attacker can intrude along path. To sum up, S-BGP and 
soBGP protocols similarly can provide origin authentication. While S-BGP provides full path 
authentication, soBGP provides a weaker static service for protecting the authenticity of 
paths. S-BGP on its own provides point-to-point connection security measures through the 
use of IPsec. Now, the issue relies on performance and complexity. There is a tradeoff 
between the level of security required and the performance and complexity issues. 
However, S-BGP is a much better solution to be further researched and endeavour to 
provide less extensive cryptographic primitives and a better way to deploy it. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Interdomain routing has shown quite a lot of interest in the last decade. This is due to 
its importance to many organisations and the whole Internet community in general. The 
Internet has become a fundamental resource in academic institutions, government agencies 
and small to large businesses, as well as a vibrant part of our daily lives. This large network 
of networks requires the interconnection and collaboration of a significant number of 
autonomously controlled networks. The good functioning of communication in the Internet 
relies on routing, which is the component that determines feasible paths (or routes) for data 
to follow from a source to a destination.  
Today and for nearly two decades, the Internet has seen a new born protocol that could 
cope with its scale of growth. The Border Gateway Protocol relies on the exchange of 
messages. More precisely, the routing information provided in tables relies on UPDATE 
messages exchanged between bordering routers in Autonomous Systems. The way BGP-4 
was designed excluded it from all security aspects. This led to an insecure interdomain 
routing protocol deployed in the entire Internet. 
BGP has shown many weaknesses and vulnerabilities to malicious behaviour. Since BGP 
requires the use of a TCP session, it inherited all the issues that the Transport Control 
Protocol has. It became vulnerable to even a larger number of different attacks. BGP can be 
subject to eavesdropping, replay, message insertion, message deletion, message 
modification, man-in-the-middle, and denial of service attacks. If the routing infrastructure 
is attacked and apprehended, it can be used to attack other systems on the Internet such as 
DNS. 
Many countermeasures were built to secure BGP. However, they are not part of the 
protocol and some of them employ weak security mechanisms. In order to provide a 
comprehensive solution for interdomain routing, the security requirements of a well 
functioning BGP need to be defined. The major three issues that need to be emphasised on 
are hop integrity (peering session protection), origin authentication of ASes and speakers, 
and route validation. 
Many solutions for securing interdomain routing have been proposed. However, 
majorly only a few have been discussed over the last five years. We covered two of them: S-
BGP and soBGP. Both of these protocols have a similar aim which is to protect BGP-4. 
However, through their design, they seek to secure different parts of the protocol through 
the use of the same cryptographic primitives. On one hand, S-BGP uses two PKIs and 
attestations to provide origin authentication and path authenticity. Moreover, it uses IPsec 
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to provide the BGP peering session with integrity, data origin authentication and 
confidentiality if required. Furthermore, it transports its data through a new attribute. On 
the hand, soBGP uses a different key distribution mechanism: the web of trust. It is majorly 
reliant on certificates. However, it does not require messages to be signed at every 
transmission. It carries the security data through a new message. 
S-BGP and soBGP have advantages and disadvantages. Some can be tolerated but 
others represent the essence of securing interdomain routing. S-BGP provides a 
comprehensive solution. It overcomes the three security problems we initially set. Although, 
it has a few residual vulnerabilities, it presents a way of overcoming those issues. However, 
it fails at providing a mechanism that secures route withdrawal or obliges speakers to 
advertise. Moreover, it requires a lot of collaboration in the Internet community to be 
deployed. Furthermore, it is computationally expensive, and memory and storage 
dependent. Thus, it requires updates and upgrades for every router that uses the protocol. 
However, soBGP is more lightweight. It requires fewer resources since it does not rely on 
extensive cryptographic processing. Moreover, it succeeds at authenticating ASes. However, 
it provides less security services. For instance, it does not provide hop integrity and does no 
authenticate paths as required by the protocol. However, it only offers the plausibility of 
routes. This is for example not tolerable since route paths represents the essence of routing. 
The primary goal of securing BGP is to have healthy routing tables. If this is not met 
accordingly, it makes the protocol very weak. Regardless of its performance and numerous 
options for deployment, it does not provide fully the most important security service. 
However, in the security world, there is always a tradeoff between level of security, and 
performance and cost. Since S-BGP provides the most comprehensive solution, it requires a 
lot of effort and a high cost to deploy it; while the feasibility of the latter is still highly 
questionable. 
Since S-BGP offers the best solution so far provided for interdomain routing, future 
research should emphasise on it. Trying to find a way to deploy it is a major issue. 
Moreover, PKIs in S-BGP become quite hairy because of the large scale of the Internet. If a 
solution to the deployment of PKI can be found, a large portion of the problem is solved. 
Moreover, cryptographic functions are generally expensive. Future BGP security research 
should try to make use of new cryptographic constructions for performance and efficiency 
matters. However, a lot of issues in soBGP need to be reviewed and perhaps redesigned. 
soBGP can see the light again but it needs to provide stronger security. 
Interdomain routing security has progressed along the years. However, the next move is 
still on hold. A lot of research is conducted but fewer solutions have been delivered. Some 
operators use a few security mechanisms to obtain some protection. However, 
comprehensive solutions are still waiting to be deployed. This is because of the complexity 
of such large scale protocol. Securing BGP is very complicated due to the density of the 
Internet. Solutions exist. Some of them are temporary such as pretty secure BGP (psBGP) 
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[68]. This protocol can be deployed and used since it is operational, until further 
improvements are made to current solutions. This dissertation has shown the importance of 
securing BGP and compared two solutions (S-BGP and soBGP). BGP is a protocol that will be 
relied on for other many years. If it keeps this state of insecurity, we might be seeing 
disastrous attacks on the routing infrastructure. Finally, BGP needs to be secured and a good 
methodology to securing it must be taken in consideration. The example of such good 
methodology is S-BGP but unfortunately, so far it is too expensive to be operational and 
deployed. 
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